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ABSTRACT
Robert Brandom denies animals implicit reasoning by emphasizing their inability to
make inferences explicit, and in so doing, denigrates animals by likening their behavior to that of
machines and artifacts. I contest, however, that animals are paradigmatically more than any
similarity or analogy to mechanical processing, just as humans are paradigmatically more than
any reductive analogy to animals. The human/animal distinction need not come at the cost of
ignoring the difference between animals and artifacts, and I believe we can largely subscribe to
Brandom’s differentiation of the human in terms of expressionism if we allow that animals can
make implicit inferences without making them explicit.
After exposing in Chapter One Brandom’s ghettoizing of animal minds, I show in the
following chapters what it might look like for humans to perform explication on behalf of
implicit animal inferences. In Chapter Two I show where Brandom departs from Heidegger, and
how there would otherwise be a place for animals in his thought. After revising Brandom along
more orthodox Heideggerian lines, I explore in Chapter Three the early Heidegger’s concept of
the world in terms of Dasein, animals, and unworlded things with an eye towards Brandom’s
inferentialism. In Chapter Four I employ Mark Okrent’s teleological understanding of rationality
to fill out Heidegger’s suggested view of animals. I conclude the thesis by showing how humans
make explicit the implicit inferences of animals.

v

INTRODUCTION:
TRADITIONS AND TERMS

The charge I bring against Robert Brandom is that in formulating his philosophy of mind
and language, he precludes any kind of mental life for animals, even higher-order animals. As
Alasdair MacIntyre points out, this oversight, in both analytic and continental circles, results
from the linguistic turn, where the over-emphasis on human discourse misconstrues our
understanding of intentionality, beliefs and desires, meaning, and communication.1 It may seem
odd, then, that I hope to rectify Brandom along Heideggerian lines, since, according to
MacIntyre (and others), Heidegger is one of the chief continental culprits of
anthropomorphism—or more specifically, what Nelson Goodman calls “linguomorphism.”2 I
must therefore explain how and why this traditional reading of Heidegger on animals is
mistaken.
First, as MacIntyre himself points out, language as such is a major (and most likely the
major) difference between humans and other animals. Language is what makes introspection and
philosophy possible, what makes art and religion possible. Thus any correction of philosophers
like Brandom and Heidegger cannot simply abandon language as essentially tied to the distinctly
human experience. That is, language profoundly shapes or enables the human mind to be what it

1

Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (Peru,
IL: Open Court, 1999), 12.
2

Nelson Goodman, “The Way the World Is,” The Review of Metaphysics 14, no. 1: 48.
1

is. Unfortunately, many twentieth-century philosophers conflate language and mind, and see the
mind as such as inseparable from language.3
Brandom outright links the mind with language, and doesn’t allow the two to be
separated: since animals don’t have language, they don’t have minds. Heidegger, since he waxes
philosophical about the importance of language for world (and implicitly mind), is often viewed
in a similar light: his choice of animals—lizards, bees, snails—emphasizes the animal as other,
la bête in every sense of the word. And yet, as I’ll argue, it’s a mistake to read Heidegger as
overly anthropocentric. Though Dasein is his foremost interest, his philosophy can account for
animals in a non-disparaging way; Brandom’s account at best uses animals metaphorically to
explain what humans are not.
According to Heidegger, things are given as zuhanden or vorhanden, and we share the
former experience of things with animals; Brandom’s bifurcation of inferences as implicit and
explicit makes the two inseparable, and animals can’t have the first since they lack the second.
Consequently, Heidegger doesn’t view animals as worldless (like rocks), just world-poor,
whereas Brandom views animals as mindless machines, simply responding mechanically to the
world (like thermostats). If, hypothetically, Brandom had allowed for animals to have implicit
inferences, he, like Heidegger, would have a viable philosophy of animal minds. It’s the goal of
this thesis to show how Brandom should have (and could have) made this allowance for animals.

3

MacIntyre carefully shows that animals don’t need language to have beliefs, and while they
often display advanced forms of communication, no matter how close animals like dolphins are
to having true language, they ultimately fall short—they could never have human language,
though they might perhaps have or acquire an some kind of dolphin “language.” See 29-41.
2

In Chapter One I explain the problem of animal minds in Brandom’s work. From there I
locate his departure from Heidegger in hopes of realigning him more charitably towards animals.
In Chapter Three I discuss Heidegger’s view of animal minds and worlds, showing the shared
world of Dasein and animals. In Chapter Four I explicate this common world in more analytic
terms. For this task I primarily employ Mark Okrent’s Rational Animals, though I must also
critique him at length for linguomorphizing animal minds. The last chapter shows how humans
can explicate the implicit inferences of animals—thus keeping Brandom’s two-part account of
mind intact while allowing for the mental lives of animals.
Before we get started, however, I need to make clear why I don’t take the traditional,
prima facie reading of Heidegger seriously, and how in fact his philosophy gives a sufficient and
substantial account of animals. Additionally, we’ll need to be clear about some central terms,
especially since the continental, analytic, and Aristotelian/Thomistic traditions are all in play
here.

The Traditional Reading of Heidegger on Animals and its Discontents
The charge I bring against Brandom is that in formulating his philosophy of mind and
language, he precludes any kind of mental life for animals, even higher-order animals; Heidegger
often receives a similar criticism, though it’s usually in terms of world, not mind. As far as this
thesis goes, I assume that when Heidegger speaks of world and Brandom and others mean of
mind, they are essentially after the same thing, perception or experience or engagement with
phenomena. It would seem that Heidegger downplays the phenomenal life of animals, especially
if one is only familiar with Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) (and this seems to be the case for
3

Brandom, Okrent, and most of the readers of Heidegger in the analytic tradition).4 Heidegger’s
1929-30 lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, is
where he most directly discusses animals; here too it’s easy to misunderstand Heidegger’s
discussion of the “impoverished” world of animals.5
The problem is that people miss the forest for the trees in these two works: Being and
Time is specifically about Dasein and Being in regard to Dasein as the being that asks after
being, and the Concepts of Metaphysics is similarly about Dasein and World in regard to Dasein
as the being that asks why there is a world and what the world as world means. Often what
Heidegger is saying about the being of Dasein or Dasein’s experience of the world is mistaken as
Heidegger’s anti-animal view of being and world, as if we could fault a book about apples for
not giving a satisfactory account of oranges. Although we might already fault the animal
enthusiast for this, what’s more amazing is that the general framework that Heidegger is
establishing in the two works, namely Zu- and Vorhandenheit and being in the world, is actually
quite charitable towards animals, emphasizing a shared zuhanden engagement with the same
world.

4

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (New York: Harper &
Row, 1962); Sein und Zeit (Halle: Niemeyer, 1927). All references to Being and Time, even in
the English, follow the standard German pagination.
5

Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans.
W. McNeill & N. Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); Der Grundbegriffe der
Metaphysik: Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit, Gesamtausgabe Band 29/30, (Frankfurt am Main:
Klostermann, 1983). When appropriate, I reference the German edition’s page numbers in
parentheses.
4

Let’s discuss the traditional, negative reading of Heidegger and animals, and then I’ll
show how Heidegger is actually linking Dasein and animals in a fundamental, positive way.

Animals in Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics
The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics is about metaphysics if only in the sense that
it is a critique and a reformulation of what the tradition means by metaphysics (and thus may
perhaps be more properly called “anti-metaphysics”). The first part of the book discusses
metaphysics in terms of Dasein, logos, and physis, and entails a fittingly dry and drawn-out
discussion of boredom as a fundamental attunement of Dasein. It is from this discussion of
metaphysical boredom that the second part of the book derives. In Part Two we have the
discussion of world and the thesis that the stone is worldless, the animal is world-poor, and man
is world-forming. Most traditional readings of Heidegger and animals ignore the background
metaphysics that undergirds the discussion of world and animals, and thus are at a loss to
understand this tripartite division of natural beings. MacIntyre, for instance, just jumps into the
discussion of animals as world-poor.
MacIntyre does mention what the key difference is between world-forming and worldpoor, though he doesn’t heed this enough: what animals lack is the ability to experience
something as something. The lizard, Heidegger says, is aware of the warm rock and even seeks it
out, but the lizard does not know the rock as rock.6 Heidegger’s point—and this is abundantly
clear in the overlooked Part One of the Fundamental Concepts—is that only humans can

6

Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 198; MacIntyre, 44.
5

understand things as things. This is metaphysics. This is philosophy. This is human. We can
know things as things because we can discourse about things and their essence; animals cannot. 7
Indeed, MacIntyre complains that Heidegger understands “nonhuman animals as such,”
entirely missing the point that only humans can consider anything “as such.”8 Heidegger is
discussing what makes animals animal, and MacIntyre claims that this carries the “underlying
assumption…that the differences between nonhuman species are of no importance or almost no
importance in any relevant sense.”9 If by relevant sense we mean metaphysics, then that’s right.
This is Heidegger’s aim, though in doing so he is doing more than merely addressing animals as
such, as I’ll explain briefly in the next section and then in more detail in Chapter Three.
One of MacIntyre’s main concerns is that Heidegger identifies “captivation” as “the
fundamental essence of the organism [animal].”10 I don’t have the space to adequately expound
what Heidegger means by this, but, in brief, he means simply the essential poverty of animals.
Animals are captive to their selves and their environment, but in typical Heideggerian form, this
captivity is described in terms of openness. It is a very un-Heideggerian reading of MacIntyre to
read captivity of animals as limiting rather than as opening.
MacIntyre comes close to understanding Heidegger’s use of “as” when he agrees that
animals can’t “grasp the world as a whole,” since this would imply (minimally) a kind of past

7

See, e.g., Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 26-33.

8

MacIntyre, 45.

9

Ibid.

10

Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 258ff..; MacIntyre, 47ff.
6

and future available only in language; however, he shows again that he misses Heidegger’s point
by insisting that some higher-order animals understand things “as food or as source of food, as
partner in or material for play,” etc.11 This is not the kind of “as structure” that Heidegger is
talking about. Both the German als and the English as denote the Latin qua, that is, “in the
capacity of,” or “as being,” and Heidegger means this in the precise, metaphysical sense
(categorical description) of something understood anaphorically as being that thing.12
Joseph J. Kockelmans explains that there are two kinds of “as structures,” the “anaphoric
as” and the “hermeneutic as.”13 Both are the “letting something become manifest”: the
hermeneutic as is manifest in our “concernful dealing with things,” and the anaphoric as is the
“articulated structure of understanding something as something.”14 The hermeneutic as isn’t
thematic or articulated; it is the engagement with something as something, food as food, for
instance. Dasein can take “the structure of something as something” and make it “explicitly
understood” anaphorically in language, but this is a derivative as structure that we don’t share
with animals:

11

MacIntyre, 47.

12

“qua,” Oxford English Dictionary. Third edition, December 2007; online version March 2012.
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/155615>; accessed 10 April 2012. An entry for this word was
first included in New English Dictionary, 1902. I compared the English “as” in the OED with the
German als in Der Duden in 10 Bänden, Band 2, Stilwörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, ed.
Drosdowski et al. (Dudenverlag: Mannheim, 1988).
13

Joseph J. Kockelmans, “Ontological Difference, Hermeneutics, and Language,” in On
Heidegger and Language, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University
Press, 1972), 198. See Being and Time, 148-160.
14

Ibid., 198, 200.
7

In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it
circumspectively, we ‘see’ it as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge; but what
we have thus interpreted need not necessarily be also taken apart by making an
assertion which definitely characterizes it.15
A horse may understand hay as food, but it cannot understand hay as hay, or food as food, that is,
anything as such. “Ein Tier kann sich nur benehmen, aber nie etwas als etwas vernehmen” (an
animal can only behave (itself), but never examine something as something).16
Heidegger claims that in the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics he is trying to do
what he did in Being and Time (and “On the Essence of Ground” (1929)), but with a different
method, namely addressing the problem of world—the question, “What is world?”—that is, his
“task is to bring the worldly character of the world into view for the first time as the possible
theme of a fundamental problem of metaphysics.17 In the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics
the method is a “comparative examination,” asking what the world is for things in the world:
material objects, animals, and humans. Animals are poor in world in that they have less access to
world:
The bee’s world is limited to a specific domain and is strictly circumscribed. And
this is also true of the world of the frog, the world of the chaffinch and so on. But
it is not merely the world of each particular animal that is limited in range—the
extent and manner in which an animal is able to penetrate whatever is accessible
to it is also limited. The worker bee is familiar with the blossoms it frequents,
along with their colour and scent, but it does not know the stamens of these

15

Heidegger, Being and Time, 149.

16

Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 376.

17

Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 176-178. Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of
Ground,” trans. William McNeill, in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, 97-135 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
8

blossoms as stamens, it knows nothing about the roots of the plant…. As against
this, the world of man is a rich one, greater in range, far more extensive in its
penetrability, constantly extendable not only in its range…but also in respect to
the manner in which we can penetrate ever more deeply in this penetrability.
Consequently we can characterize the relation man possesses to the world by
referring to the extendability of everything that he relates to. This is why we can
speak of man as world-forming.18
This does not mean, as MacIntyre suggests, that Heidegger is anthropocentrically evaluating
bees, frogs, and birds in this light—“Every animal and every species of animal as such is just as
perfect and complete as any other,” says Heidegger, “this talk of poverty in world and worldformation must not be taken as a hierarchical evaluation”—nor is he chauvinistically indifferent
towards our common animality. Indeed, poverty is how man too comports himself:
poverty is not merely a characteristic property, but the very way in which man
comports and bears himself [such as in humility or melancholy]. Poverty in this
proper sense of human existence is also a kind of deprivation and necessarily so.
Yet from such deprivation we can draw our peculiar power of procuring
transparency and inner freedom for Dasein.19
Heidegger does not use the word poverty pejoratively either when describing animals or
Dasein. Like every term he employs, he uses it in a very precise sense that must be understood in
its precise meaning or usage, which usually derives from its etymology, not according to
preconceived or prima facie senses of the word in isolation from his text. Moreover, this poor
world actually turns out to be quite rich, as I discuss in Chapter Three.

18

Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 193.

19

Ibid., 195.
9

Animals and Being and Time
Being and Time is often misread. As I mentioned earlier, those who read it as
anthropomorphic somehow miss the point that it is about being and time as regards man, and so
it’s only anthropomorphic in the sense that a book about war is hawkish. Another major
misunderstanding is to see the breakthrough of Being and Time as drawing our attention to tools
and equipment. But “It never occurred to me,” says Heidegger, “to try and claim or prove with
this interpretation [of equipmentality in Being and Time] that the essence of man consists in the
fact that he knows how to handle knives and forks or use the tram.”20 The real breakthrough of
Being and Time, according to Brandom, is the ontological distinction between Vorhandenheit
and Zuhandenheit, which emphasizes Dasein’s more originary engagement with the world.
Animals are only mentioned three times in Being and Time, and in ways only tangentially
related to animals as regards the topic at hand. Still, what Heidegger has to say about the being of
Dasein has (positive) implications for animals. Drawing primarily on The History of the Concept
of Time: Prolegomena (which is almost a rough draft of Being and Time),21 it is my contention
in Chapter Three that animals have a similar originary engagement with the world, and
Zuhandenheit is a kind of bond between us and them. In Being and Time, however, Heidegger
limits his discussion to Dasein, and so we should first mention this distinction in human terms.

20

Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 177.

21

Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore Kisiel
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992 [1979]); Prolegomena zur Geschichte des
Zeitbegriffs, in Gasamtausgabe, Band 20 (Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1925)
(Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1975). When appropriate, I reference the German edition’s
page numbers in parentheses.
10

In short, Vorhandeneheit (“present-at-hand”) is understanding beings or a being
objectively, whereas Zuhandenheit (“ready-to-hand,” “handy”) is the direct engagement of
beings. A hammer can be understood in terms of its shape, weight, color, etc.—scientifically, to
speak—and it can be understood in its use as a hammer—equipmentally. Heidegger’s insight is
that Vorhandenheit springs from Zuhandenheit, not the other way around: usefulness or
engagement isn’t a quality added to an object, as the tradition (through Husserl), would
understand it.
Heidegger is often praised for this “inversion” of the subject/object ontological structure,
but it’s more correct to say that he has gotten to a deeper, more “originary” ontology only from
which the subject/object dichotomy is possible. This is all important. As Jean-Luc Marion puts it,
the analysis of the ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) plays a decisive role in the entire
analytic of Dasein, since it establishes not only that Dasein does not entertain first
a theoretical relation to the world, but above all that intraworldly entities are not
in the mode of objects constituted by an objectification produced by the subject,
but rather in the mode of a handiness which in turn determines Dasein itself as it
were handled by what it handles.22
Although Being and Time pertains specifically to Dasein, this insight into our originary
engagement with the world applies analogously to animals. It’s my contention in this thesis that
animals operate (only) zuhanden. Everything, “house and yard, forest and field, sun, light and

22

” Jean-Luc Marion, “Le sujet en dernier appel,” Revue de Métaphysque et de Morale 1 (1991):
78, quoted in François Raffoul, “The Destruction of Vorhandenheit,” in Heidegger and the
Subject, trans. David E. Pettigrew and Gregory Recco (Humanity Books, Amherst, New York.
1998), n.6. This chapter of Raffoul’s is especially helpful for understanding how Heidegger’s
notions of being-in, world, nature, derive from his destruction of Vorhandenheit.
11

heat,” is zuhanden.23 As François Raffoul puts it, “the whole of entities, insofar as they appear in
the midst of the environment, are primarily ready-to-hand”24; we need only remember for
animals too, objects in their environment present themselves as ready-to-hand— “the lizard has
its own relation [eine Beziehung] to the rock, to the sun, and to a host of other things,” as
Heidegger says.25 We are explicitly not to understand the lizard’s relation to his environment as
“vorhanden” 26; the lizard is closer to Dasein than to the rock in that it and all animals have a
world, however ever poor, and it engages that world as zuhanden. I explain the zuhanden life of
animals in Chapter Three.

Terminology
This thesis draws from three traditions and schools of thought which are already in
dialogue with one another: the analytic, neo-Hegelian pragmatism of Robert Brandom, the
continental phenomenology and existentialism of Martin Heidegger, and the
Aristotelian/Thomistic teleology of Mark Okrent and Alasdair MacIntyre. Though the
philosophers I discuss are all familiar with and draw from each other’s primary traditions, the
threefold (at least) vocabulary can be confusing—cumbersome at best. I try to be faithful to the
nuances of the different vocabularies while preserving a clear and consistent usage across the
23

Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982), 108. Cf. Being and Time 103 and 245.
24

Raffoul, 171.

25

Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 198 (291).

26

Ibid.
12

traditions. It may be helpful, however, to here delineate some key terms, both to explain their
idiosyncratic usage and to clarify how I will use such terms generally in my discussion. I assume
that the teleological and Heideggerian terms are more familiar that those of Brandom, so I’ll
explain some of Brandom’s key terms up front, whereas I’ll address the teleological and
Heideggerian terms as we go.
I might also add here that I typically reserve the word “animal” to mean a nonhuman
animal, though this is done for clarity and shouldn’t be seen as downplaying humans as animals
(after all, Aquinas of all people, as Alasdair MacIntyre points out, is perfectly content with
calling nonhuman animals “other animals”; distinguishing man from other animals doesn’t imply
a denial of human animality).27 When I do talk of lower- and higher-order animals, I typically am
referring to animals such as insects as the former and birds and dolphins as the latter, in keeping
(somewhat reluctantly) with common usage. That I’m uncomfortable with the space between
lower- and higher-order animals, not to mention those animals that push the extremes towards
plants and humans, will become clear as we go on.

27

MacIntyre, 6. Richard Sorabji, by contrast, prefers (“For ease of reading”) not to call
nonhuman animals “other animals” (or mankind “humankind,” for that matter), “despite [his]
sympathies.” See his Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 1.
13

Key Brandomian Terms28
Sentience vs. Sapience: “Sentience is a matter of being aware in the sense of being awake that
we share at least with our vertebrate cousins. Feelings of pain and sensations of red are
paradigmatic sentient episodes. Sapient states, such as beliefs and intentions, and sapient
episodes such as thinkings, by contrast, have propositional contents that are expressed in English
by the use of ‘that’ clauses with declarative sentences as complements.”29 Similar dichotomies
Brandom uses are vocal/verbal30 and implicit/explicit (see below).

Implicit/Explicit (inferences, norms, etc.): Implicit inferences or norms don’t depend on an
attitude or position towards the inference or norm. Brandom claims that litmus paper and iron
rusting follow rules—they literally obey norms. Expliciting is the act or attitude of making
implicit inferences and norms explicit. Implicit inference and norms also exist socially,
linguistically—in every capacity—and they are just as real and objective as iron rusting, though
not in the sense of top-down platonic truths. Brandom says that animals obey norms and make
inferences only inasmuch as rusty nails do; for him, implicit reasoning requires expliciting (see
below).

28

For a lucid introduction to Brandom’s work, see Jeremy Wanderer’s Robert Brandom
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008). His clarity and my debt to him
should be evident in this section, in which I draw heavily from him.
29

Brandom, “From a Critique of Cognitive Internalism to a Conception of Objective Spirit:
Reflections on Descombes’ Anthropological Holism,” Inquiry 47 (2004): 238.
30

E.g. Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2000), 14 and 17.
14

Expliciting, Making Explicit: For some reason Brandom says “expliciting,” not explicating;
Jeremy Wander’s helpful introduction to his work doesn’t use the neologism, and he considers
this concept, central as it is, to be rather unclear and unstable in Brandom’s thought.31 What is
clear is that expliciting is both an ability and a practice. The ability entails language, and
involves being able to say or explain (explicit) abilities performed implicitly, like what makes for
a good golf swing. Good expliciting, however, doesn’t depend on good implicit ability, as with
sports coaches.32 One can even make explicit social and linguistic practices and norms, and
though this is of great interest to Brandom, it doesn’t bear directly on this thesis.
Another way to understand making explicit is according to Brandom’s “two-ply account
of observation.” As Wanderer summarizes it, “claiming that ‘the swatch is red’, involves an
exercise of two distinct practical capacities…the ability to respond differently to some stimulus,
and…the ability to make a move in a linguistic practice.”33 It’s not enough to be aware of or
even respond to something implicitly; one must be able to make explicit and engage explicitly
that thing for there to be real rational activity.
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Normative: “Normative vocabulary,” explains Wanderer, “involves terms that are fraught with
ought. Examples include terms such as ‘correct’, ‘should’, ‘good’, ‘permissible’, obligatory’, and
‘right’.”34 Norms exists and are binding regardless of whether or not they are known or even can
be known (see the next section).
When I use the word normativity, I mean the objectively prescriptive good that pertains
to and supervenes over different categories of things and concepts, the same against which we
can evaluate instances of such categories. Normativity for animals is the objective structure of
teleology and flourishing particular to the animal, relevant group of animals, species, etc. I find
this in keeping with Brandom’s conception of norms, specifically in regards to socio-linguistic
norms, but it also fully encompasses natural (teleological, evolutionary, etc.) normativity in
Okrent’s sense and in the Aristotelian/Thomistic sense more generally.
Humans have a unique kind of normativity in that the norms that govern our behavior
aren’t natural but rational. We act based on reasons that transcend the individual and social
norms set by biology and society. For Brandom, such human norms are Hegelian, though for our
purposes, just what those norms are doesn’t matter.

Simple vs. Interpreting Performers, Normative Statuses vs. Attitudes: A simple performer’s
performance can be treated as having a normative status, though the performer doesn’t have a
normative attitude (in theory or with mechanical or chemical performers). An interpreting
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performer, by virtue of its normative attitudes, institutes—creates, maintains, or develops—
normative statuses.

Inference: Taking one claim or assertion as the basis for another claim or assertion. This giving
and taking for reasons is characteristic of sapience. Everything is implicitly connected in a web
of inferences (tree, wood, house, hammer, nail, roof, rain, to invoke Heidegger here), and to be
sapient is to draw out these inferences (to make explicit), as well as live and move about in the
space of reasons, of theoretical inferences (inferences based on beliefs and desires, rules of logic,
etc.).

Mental Content, Mental States
Although the distinction between mental content and mental states is not fixed in the
literature, I adopt Okrent’s usage. For him, mental content is simply the mental stuff that’s there
(be it some kind of representation or simply perception or whatever), whereas mental states are
intentional positions in regard to the mental content. More specifically, mental states are the
“beliefs and desires of rational agents” that persist over time, including “natural”
(biological/evolutionary) states and “rational” (individual/subjective) states.35
Attributing mental content to animals is innocuous enough, though it doesn’t really work
with very simple forms of animal life (and so I insist in Chapter Four that we just stick with
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teleology); attributing mental states, however, is presumptuous and anthropomorphic—indeed
linguomorphic—since the real fault is to attribute an overly linguoform view of mental life to
animals, for which we have little justification.
All animals have mental content or mental perception, whatever that might be like. Of
course the richness of representation and perception varies greatly from frogs to dogs, and from
horses to humans, and more basic animals may not have any kind of central “mental” content of
perception at all. Intentional states are propositional, though not necessarily linguistic (at least in
principle). The temptation (into which I believe Okrent unwittingly falls) is to think of
propositions in terms of language; the alternative (my suggestion) would be to think of them not
as sentences but as modalities.36 The implicit grasp of a series of modalities, affected by
dispositions and desire, is entirely different from the explicit arrangement of propositions, about
which we can discuss and ponder along with our dispositions and desires. Humans have
language and reflection; higher-order animals may have a rich and creative grasp of modalities
and their own motives and dispositions, but we don’t need to appeal to language or introspection
to explain their mental lives. Indeed, to project language or introspection would be to
anthropomorphize them—to linguomorphize them—and I argue in Chapter Four that this is
precisely what Okrent does, despite his great insight into normative teleology.
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Why Care about this Problem?
Jeremy Wanderer doesn’t take issue with Brandom’s use of parrots and thermometers as
counterpoints to human sapience:
it may seem chauvinistic in the extreme, [but] the intention is not to catalogue
purported deficiencies designed to elevate the status of man over beast. …Without
a doubt, this demarcational starting point forces attention on our own case, but
such reflection is not anthropocentric per se, and not all self-regard need be
dismissed as excessive.37
Why shouldn’t we agree?
First, Brandom is too often and too egregiously “beastly towards the beasts,” to use his
phrase, for us not to level the charge of anthropocentric chauvinism.38 I draw this out in Chapter
1. Additionally, his philosophy is simply wrong when it comes to animals, and so in the interest
of truth I feel obligated to correct him, especially since his core assumptions (and even some of
his superfluous ones) don’t commit him to the anti-animal stance he presents. Furthermore, I
echo MacIntyre’s motive for writing Dependant Rational Animals, that humans are a kind of
animal, and to misunderstand them is to misunderstand ourselves.39 Thus, as insightful as
Brandom’s work is, it’s deficient in regard to what we share with animals. In this thesis I hope to
draw out our shared engagement with the world in a way that doesn’t compromise Brandom’s
philosophy of language and mind but in fact enhances it.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM OF ANIMAL MINDS IN BRANDOM40

As distinguished from the extantness of material things and from the
existence of humans, we call the mode of being of plants and animals: life.
Martin Heidegger41

Robert Brandom refers to humans as concept-using animals, distinct from other animals
in their discursive practices, namely in their ability to articulate inferences, and he convincingly
shows how concepts are commitments that are articulatable within a web of reasons. This web
links implicit and explicit inferences, and, Brandom claims, is inherently linguistic. If we grant
Brandom’s definition of linguistic discourse as unique to human cognition (thus precluding
discussion of putative nonhuman language and discourse, let alone infants and severely impaired
humans who cannot articulate reasons), we still run into a problem concerning nonhuman,
higher-order animals (hereafter “animals”), for Brandom lumps animal cognition with
mechanical computation throughout his major opus, Making It Explicit, and its abbreviated form,
Articulating Reasons. He often speaks of parrots as a kind of thermostat reacting reliably to
stimuli and nothing more. The problem has two dimensions: counterintuitive conclusions and
their corresponding (im)moral implications.
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There seems to be an obvious categorical difference between animals such as parrots and
artifacts such as thermostats, so Brandom’s insistent grouping of the two together fails to
correspond to our (or at least my) intuitions of reality. Brandom usually associates animals and
artifacts when he is emphasizing how human perception exceeds mere stimuli—we see red in a
web of inferences, such as blood, wine, stop, rage, etc. Insofar as Brandom is exaggerating the
mechanical aspect of animals in order to more clearly contrast them with the discursive aspect of
humans, we can grant him rhetorical license. The ease and frequency of this reductive gesture,
however, suggests otherwise.
Brandom’s philosophical categorization of humans leaves little doubt that he actually
views animals as biological machines. What would be nondiscursive (pre-linguistic) inferences
in humans are analogous in animals to the nondiscursive deductions of computers. That is,
Brandom draws a sharp line between humans and nonhumans: only humans make inferences. If
animals are no more than machines, we have no more moral duty towards animals than we do
towards machines.
Brandom admits that his project “risks being beastly to the beasts” because it focuses on
“the fanciest sort of intentionally”—ours—“that involves expressive capacities that cannot be
made sense of apart from participation in linguistic practices.”42 He claims that his project
depends on “the lower grades of intentionality,” presumably of animals, inasmuch as he hopes to
show how “linguistic abilities arise out of nonlinguistic ones.”43 That this pseudo-apology
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follows a discussion of “Descartes’ seminal demarcational story” should clue the reader into the
fact that Brandom in truth views animals and artifacts in the same light—both without
intentionality except in the basest form, such as iron rusting.44 The mechanistic logic that denies
conceptual mental content with language in animals, as found in Descartes, runs throughout
Brandom’s work.
The implications of this Cartesian gesture go against our moral intuitions that recognize
some responsibility towards animals based on their cognitive faculties, emotions, ability to feel
pain, etc.; but even if this moral intuition, however deeply rooted, is nothing more than an
argument from analogy, as Peter Harrison claims,45 there is still the problem of categorically
treating animals as machines, at least in the Heideggerian sense of enframing.46 That is, the
intuition that harming an animal is categorically different than “harming” an artifact goes beyond
mere analogies between humans and animals—we humans evidently recognize that the
difference between a live animal and a dead animal is not the same as the difference between a
functioning machine and a defunct machine. I contend that we categorically view living things as
having inherent value apart from any imputed value we may attribute to animals and artifacts alike.
To deny this moral obligation humans have towards living things is to label any
sentiments towards animals as no different from those we may have towards artifacts (a wedding
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ring, for example). That is, such sentiments could be dismissed in pursuit of, say, science: live
vivisections of animals would be like tinkering with a running machine. This, as in Descartes’
day, goes against our moral intuitions about life and about responsibility towards living things.
If we believe there is something that makes animals and artifacts ultimately
incommensurable, namely life, can we make sense of the distinction of living/non-living in light
of Brandom’s human/nonhuman distinction? That is, would modifying Brandom’s initial
distinction between humans and nonhumans create room for the distinction between animals and
artifacts? Or, keeping Brandom’s initial distinction, what further distinctions need to be made to
separate animals from artifacts?
We need to briefly go over how Brandom’s theory of inferentialism works before we can
hope to locate or create a space within the theory for animals. We also need to show how animals
differ from nonanimals in order to group them with humans in opposition to mere things.

Differentiating Humans from Animals
Both Making It Explicit and Articulating Reasons are about the “use and content of
concepts” especially as regards “the nature of language [in] . . . us rational, indeed logical,
concept-mongering creatures” (and since the latter is the shorter, condensed version of the two,
most of my references are to Articulating Reasons).47 Moreover, in the Introduction to
Articulating Reasons, Brandom lays his cards on the table, showing where he stands on nine
philosophical issues that bear on his inferentialism. The Introduction makes clear his

47

Making It Explicit, 1; Articulating Reasons, xi.
23

disingenuous position on animal minds, and by looking at the first five methodological stances, I
hope to pinpoint where his theory could be altered so as to create a space for animals as distinct
from artifacts.
His first foundational philosophical position, siding with “differentiation” over
“assimilation” (prioritizing “discontinuities between discursive and nondiscursive creatures”)
bears most directly on the topic at hand.48 Brandom is not just showing his differential approach
towards “creatures”; already—on page 2—he is showing his indifference towards nonhuman
animals by assimilating them with artifacts: “the judgments and actions of concept users, on the
one hand, and the uptake of environmental information and instrumental interventions of nonconcept-using organisms and artifacts, on the other.”49 The crux of this assimilation of animals
and artifacts is that Brandom opposes them both as non-concept-using to humans, who are, by
definition, concept-using.
The implicit reason for rejecting conceptual ability in animals lies in Brandom’s second
stance as a pragmatic functionalist, rather than a “platonist.” The “platonist,” here, is one who
explains the “use of concepts in terms of a prior understanding of conceptual content”; Brandom,
however, “seeks to explain how the use of linguistic expressions, or the functional role of
intentional states, confers conceptual content on them.”50 The platonist would consider what
conceptual content might or must be and then locate it, presumably by degree, in higher- and
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lower-order animals. For Brandom, however, our unique ability to make “explicit propositions or
principles form the direction of what is implicit in practices” indicates, or rather consists in, our
unique capacity to have, through participation, (linguistic) conceptions of reality, and defines us
as sapient creatures.51 According to Brandom, one’s conception of reality (as concepts) is an all
or nothing game.
Animals and artifacts don’t have conceptions of the world, according to Brandom,
because they do not have language as such, they only have “a primitive kind of practical taking
of something as something.”52 For Brandom, neither the mind nor language is the locus of
intentionality—his third philosophical position. “Concepts are applied in the realm of language
by the public use of sentences and other linguistic expressions,” says Brandom, “[and] are
applied in the realm of mind by the private adoption of and rational reliance on beliefs and other
intentional states.”53 Since animals don’t have a public language, and “concept use is not
intelligible in a context that does not include language use,” then they can’t have beliefs and
intentional states.54 Even “[o]ur mammalian cousins, primate ancestors, and neonatal offspring,”
though “sentient and purposive but not discursive creatures,” don’t have concepts and intentional
states.55 We may interpret them derivatively as having intentionality, but they do not. If our
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infants and evolutionary forefathers can’t make implicit inferences, then certainly there’s no
room for animal intentionality.
The denial of intentional states with external language in animals corresponds with
Brandom’s fourth preference for expression over representation as the genus of concepts. The
project of “representation,” contra Brandom’s project, assumes that “simpler forms of
[representation] are exhibited already in the activity of non-concept-using creatures, and on that
basis elaborate ever more complex forms until one reaches something recognizable as
specifically conceptual representation.”56 For Brandom, however, expressions (“making explicit
what is implicit”) and concepts are necessarily related.57 The assumption, again, is that only
humans can do this unique thing, namely “turning something we can initially only do into
something we can say: codifying some sort of knowing how in the form of knowing that.”58
(“Initially” seems to apply to pre-linguistic humans, i.e. infants, not evolutionarily pre-human
animals, e.g. orangutans.)
The fifth stance, viewing the conceptual as inferential, not intentional, is a major fulcrum
of Brandom’s theory and, perhaps equally so, of my criticism. (Accordingly, this is the last of the
nine stances I will discuss, the other four being less pertinent.) He says, “[W]hat distinguishes
specifically discursive practices from the doings of non-concept-using creatures is their
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inferential articulation. To talk about concepts is to talk about roles in reasoning.”59 Key to
Brandom’s inferentialism is that
it understands expressing something, making it explicit, as putting it in a form in
which it can serve as and stand in need of reasons: a form in which it can serve as
both premise and conclusion in inferences. Saying or thinking that things are
thus-and-so is undertaking a distinctive kind of inferentially articulated
commitment.60
Brandom’s inferentialism, therefore, encapsulates his “constitutive, pragmatist, relationally
linguistic, conceptual expressivism” that differentiates humans from animals and artifacts (9).
My criticism is that Brandom unjustly ignores the difference between animals and
artifacts by ignoring the minimum (though profound) similarity between humans and animals as
living creatures. He fails by his own account:
Of course, wherever the story starts [assimilation or differentiation of the
conceptual], it will need to account both for the ways in which concept use is like
the comportments of non-discursive creatures and the ways in which it differs.
Theories that assimilate conceptually structured activity to the nonconceptual
activity out of which it arises . . . are in danger of failing to make enough of the
difference. Theories that adopt the converse strategy [differentiation] . . . court the
danger of not doing justice to generic similarities.61
Brandom simply does not do justice to the generic similarities of humans and animals, thereby
trivializing what distinguishes animals from mere things.

59

Ibid., 10-11.

60

Ibid., 11.

61

Ibid., 3.
27

Differentiating Animals from Artifacts
In a rare and all too brief section of Articulating Reasons, Brandom distinguishes animals
from artifacts:
Sentience is what we share with nonverbal animals such as cats—the capacity to
be aware in the sense of being awake. Sentience, which so far as our
understanding yet reaches is an exclusively biological phenomenon, is in turn to
be distinguished from the mere reliable differential responsiveness we sentients
share with artifacts such as thermostats and land mines. Sapience, by contrast,
concerns understanding or intelligence other than irritability or arousal.62
According to Brandom, the pigeon and the thermostat are alike in their ability to reliably respond
to stimuli, only pigeons do this biologically and thermostats mechanically. I’m afraid that would
be Descartes’ position as well.
But even if animals have no mind similar to humans (no sapience), the reduction of
animals to mechanical operations implies the difference between animals and artifacts: what is
amazing about a dog performing a trick is that it is performing a trick, that it is trained; the
specialness of dog training as opposed to computer programming is made apparent when the dog
gets confused and messes up. Machines don’t get nervous or distracted by crowds of people; they
don’t suddenly become more interested in an observer’s hat or shoe than in their master’s voice
or treat. That is, the ability to mechanize animals (imperfectly) only reveals the fact that they are
not machines.
Consider this typical, inhumane comparison of a thermometer and a parrot: “The
difference between a tape-triggering thermometer or a parrot trained to utter ‘It’s getting
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warmer’ when exposed to suitable changes of temperature and the human observer’s . . . lies . . .
in the understanding of the classificatory significance attributed to those responses,” i.e., lies in
the human’s understanding of the meaning of “it’s getting warmer” and the
thermometer/animal’s lack of understanding.63
Now let us conceive of the situation differently and see how Brandom’s conclusions fare.
Let’s keep the thermometer and the human observer from off the street, but instead of a parrot
let’s use a foreigner who can’t speak the native tongue, but whom we taught to successfully
announce when “it’s getting warmer” without teaching her what the words mean.
That “the [American] observer does and the instrument does not grasp or attribute such a
signification to its own response” still is true in the adapted situation, but what about with the
foreign observer?64 Are we to assume that even though she doesn’t have the linguistic analogues
to “it’s getting warmer,” she wouldn’t (or couldn’t) grasp the implicit meaning of her response to
stimuli, namely that it’s getting warmer?
I think it is fair to assume that, given human intellect, humans can understand implicit
meanings even without any ability to make explicit (in the English language, for example) what
they understand implicitly. That is, the foreigner would understand that it is getting warmer, and
that getting warmer corresponds to the sounds “ ts g t t ng wôrm r”; she would be able to
understand the semantic correspondence to the stimulus no matter whether she were trained to
say “es wird wärmer” or “plank slab block.” We know this because, as Brandom points out,
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humans can understand inferences theoretically. If we grant that animals can’t understand
theoretical inferences, on what grounds besides presumption does Brandom assert that animals
have no more implicit understanding of practical inferences than artifacts such as thermometers
do? Mark Okrent is able to give a compelling account of animal rationality grounded in teleology
while still maintaining a unique kind of linguistic rationality in humans (grounded in their selfdetermining teleology). That is, even if Brandom is right to assert that humans alone can perform
theoretical inferences, Okrent shows again and again how animals perform what can only be
called practical inferences.
Okrent works off Donald Griffin’s description of the plover bird’s “broken wing
display,”65 a creatively variable defense mechanism used by other bird species as well, and
perhaps also by fish.66 The plover feigns injury to distract predators away from the bird’s nest,
but not in a programmatic way; rather, the bird behaves in a richly versatile way, adapting to the
changing situation, taking into consideration, so to speak, variable environmental factors and
actions of the predator, what Michael Wheeler might call flexible, adaptive richness.67 Of note to
Okrent is that the bird isn’t merely responding to given stimuli according to biological
programming (if you will) or innate goals, as lower-order animals do. The Sphex wasp, for
instance, displays a kind of rationality that adapts to changes in its environment, but it adapts in a
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predictable, systematic way when an experimenter moves the food for its eggs, a caterpillar, as
the wasp checks the burrow before adding the caterpillar.68 Okrent comments,
What the plover does is more versatile and adaptive than what the wasp does in a
wider range of circumstances. The plover can deal with the presence of
experimental intervention [of a scientist] far more effectively than the wasp can,
for example. And the plover is far more capable of adjusting her behavior in light
of what seems to be a recognition of the failure of a previous behavior to achieve
its proximate end than is the wasp. You won’t find a plover endlessly repeating a
failed subroutine in the way that the wasp in the example does. For those reasons,
among others, we say that the plover’s behavior is more rational.69
By more rational, Okrent means that lower-order animals only have an instrumental rationality
(teleology), whereas higher-order animals act according to goals that are determined by their
rational beliefs and desires (though they lack mental awareness of intentionality). Okrent’s
contention that higher-order animals act on (non-conscious) intentionality is a stronger claim
than I am making, that animals make practical inferences. Okrent shows that animals act
according to the general principles of their teleology (innate goals), and in ways that are
“flexible, versatile, and appropriate in novel ways” (intentionality),70 and this intentional
teleology fits—if not exceeds—Brandom’s description of the “intrinsically motivating
preferences or desires” of practical inferences and rational action,71 thus showing that practical
inferences are prior to, or at least separable from, theoretical inferences.
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Therefore, to return to the thermometer parrot story, the parrot is more like a foreigner
than a thermometer in saying that it’s getting warmer, for they are both recognizing and acting
upon a desired goal, a practical inference, as opposed to the thermometer which simply responds
to “merely external factors,” as Okrent would put it.72 Though neither the parrot nor the foreigner
understands the semantics of the English language, they both recognize the inference that when it
gets warmer, they say “it’s getting warmer,” whereas the thermometer can’t make practical
inferences. Thus, rather than showing animals as reducible to biological machines, Brandom’s
example actually highlights the similarities of humans and animals as distinct from artifacts.

Synthesizing Animal Implicit and Human Explicit Understanding
Although Brandom’s anti-animal rhetoric in Making It Explicit and Articulating Reasons
pervades his very system of inferentialism, the task of creating a space in his theory for animals
to make implicit inferences may be easier than it seems. In fact, an earlier work of his gives us a
rubric for incorporating animal inferences into his schema.
Brandom’s 1985 “Varieties of Understanding” delves into familiar categories of
understanding, “that which remains implicit in practice, and that which becomes explicit in
principles.”73 Of course, Brandom is interested in “the sophisticated kind of understanding which
is explicitly instituted, codified, and communicated in the form of explications” (which are
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ultimately founded upon implicit practice), but he rather candidly (for him) affirms implicit
inferences apart from (not merely prior to) explicit understanding, albeit somewhat
condescendingly: “Students of animal learning are concerned with the simple kind of
understanding which is implicit in the skilled practice of prelinguistic performers whose behavior
must be treated as regular rather than rule governed.”74 In contrast with his recent work which
emphasizes a differentialist approach to rationality, here Brandom the “pragmatist emphasizes
the continuity of human understanding with animal understanding . . . by contrast to the
platonist’s emphasis on the discontinuities marked by animals’ incapacity to act according to
explicit principles.”75 Let us discuss his pragmatist approach here before reconciling it with his
later, more platonic approach.
The first move of the pragmatist “is to try to explain understanding that something is the
case . . . in terms of understanding how to do something, and further to understand understanding
. . . simply as being able to do something, to perform appropriately according to some
practice.”76 Implicit inferences involve doing the appropriate things appropriately—a cat waiting
for a mouse, a man shooing a fly. While this is prelinguistic, I don’t see why it mustn’t include
rationality, broadly construed, perhaps even what we call phronesis.77 We needn’t attribute
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beliefs and desires, as Mark Okrent does, to quasi-rational animals to admit some form of
rationality to animals. Simply put, higher-order animals seem to display flexible and adaptive
goal-directed behavior, what I want to call phronesis, much like we do—but this does not
obviate the extreme gap between such shared phronesis and the uniquely human rationality of
self-reflection, anxiety, soul, conscience, Dasein, or, as Brandom would have it, the explanatory
understanding involved in making inferences explicit.
Brandom continues: “to describe the form of such an account [of explicit understanding],”
however, “is not to offer an account of explicit understanding.”78 Even if we can give an account of a
broken-wing display performing bird in terms of beliefs and desires (as Okrent does), our description
does not imply such explicit understanding in the bird (as Okrent rightly points out).79 That is, even if
the bird is reasoning (adapting to unique situations with unique goals), it is, for all we know, not
reasoning in a reflective way (“If I do such and such maybe—I hope!—such and such will happen”);
rather, it is reasoning only on the implicit level (as we do when we judge whether to scoot our seat
forward or back when sitting). When we hail a taxi, it involves some kind of thought or desire (a taxi)
and requisite action (signaling), but this thought and action isn’t reflective (“I find myself wanting a
taxi”); just so with animals—actions, rationality, desires, or what have you, are reflexive, but not
self-reflexive.

of animal minds in the West; phronesis is not enough, for the denial of reason necessitates an
expansion of perception in order to account for what animals do; Aquinas’s vis aestimativa
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What distinguishes humans is the ability to make explicit such implicit desires, reasons,
etc.—“inferences,” according to Brandom—in an explanatory gesture. Animals, however, can’t
explain to themselves or to us how something is, only that something is. This “expliciting,”
according to Brandom, goes hand in hand with “impliciting”; but if animals can’t “explicit,” how
do they “implicit” inferences? The later Brandom seems unable to leave room in his philosophy
for animals to be able to make implicit inferences, and so lumps the animals with the artifacts.
Nonetheless, I contend that we can redeem Brandom’s later two-sides-of-the-coin approach to
inferences by appealing to his earlier account of understanding, and so rescue animals from the
ghetto of Cartesian objects.
We can allow for animals to have implicit inferences but not the ability to make such
inferences explicit, without rejecting the two-sided coin account of inferences, if we allow
humans to make explicit animal inferences on their behalf. In order to “turn [implicit inferences]
into an [explicit] account one must at least be prepared to offer a pragmatist story about how to
build explicit understanding as codified in principles out of forms of understanding which are
merely implicit, manifesting themselves only in appropriate practice and not in such
principles.”80 Such an explication, however, cannot be mere description, as noted above. For
example, such an explication cannot merely appeal to evolutionary biology or behaviorism. We
need a story that goes beyond mere description or ascription, and we will attempt that in the
following chapters.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LOCATING THE PROBLEM WITHIN BRANDOM’S APPROPRIATION OF HEIDEGGER

Commonly the arguments run something like this. Some particular capacity is
made the object of enquiry….And it is then shown how, contrary to the views of
some philosophical predecessor, the human exercise of this particular capacity
involves the possession and use of language. It is finally further concluded that,
because nonhuman animals do not possess language, or at least the requisite kind
of language, they must also lack the capacity or ability or power in question.
MacIntyre81

Finding out how Brandom appropriates Heidegger into his philosophy is a rather easy
task, for he discusses Heidegger in relation to his work explicitly in his book, Tales of the Mighty
Dead. Tales is a “historical” presentation of Brandom’s philosophy, whereas his other works—
he mentions specifically Making It Explicit and Articulating Reasons—have been of a more
systematic nature.82 Brandom’s heroes are, as he puts it, a “motley group,” but they are also not
unsurprising: Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, Frege, Heidegger, and Sellars.83 He has an essay or two
on each thinker besides three introductory chapters. The three chapters form Part One, which
stands alone as a discussion of the tradition generally, and in the brief Heidegger section of
Chapter 2 we can see how Brandom’s appropriation of Heidegger goes awry.
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Brandom’s Inferentialist Reading of Zu- and Vorhandenheit
Brandom seems to think, perhaps rightly, that Heidegger’s most important contribution to
philosophy is the ontological distinction between Zu- and Vorhandenheit. Unfortunately,
Brandom manipulates the terms so that while maintaining their basic meaning, he trivializes the
primacy of Zuhandenheit by making the two mutually dependent. This, I will argue, explains
why Brandom cannot account for animal minds whereas an orthodox take on Heidegger’s Zuand Vorhandenheit can.
Brandom reads Heidegger as a pragmatist, which is an understandable (even if not a
desirable) reading, and I don’t think Brandom’s pragmatism directly sets him up for failure with
animal minds. Prima facie, Brandom’s description of the pragmatist project, “to explain knowing
that in terms of knowing how,” looks to line up quite nicely with Vor- and Zuhandenheit, the
ontology of a thing as an item of inquiry and as an item in use.84 I believe that Brandom’s
pragmatism and Heidegger’s Vorhandenheit/Zuhandenheit ontology can match up in an
interesting way, but not as Brandom develops it.
Similarly, and more importantly, Brandom reads inferentialism into Heidegger. He reads
Vorhandenheit as “high-end intentionality” and Zuhandenheit as “a kind of preconceptual
intentionality.”85 I believe we can understand inferentialism in terms of Vor- and Zuhandenheit,
and indeed we ought to, but the way Brandom develops the connection fails, particularly in
regards to animal minds as I shall argue.
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A Review of Heidegger’s Zu- and Vorhandenheit
Let us begin by rehashing briefly the genius of Heidegger’s zu – and vorhanden
ontological distinction. Heidegger’s insight is that we do not think of a hammer objectively (as
an object of inquiry) while using it to hammer. That is, much of our interaction with the world is
direct, such as sitting in a chair or catching ourselves as we trip over something. Abstract thought
does not come into play in such operations unless the hammer or chair breaks. Only then is the
object viewed as something foreign or alien to us, whereas before the hammer was an extension
of us for doing a certain type of thing, and the chair a means for us to extend ourselves in a
certain way. That is, the hammer is not some object which we first consider abstractly as
weighing so much and having such a shape, which then gives it the property of being a hammer.
Objects don’t have usability or equipmentality added to them, since we engage with items of
gear prior to or without considering them as objects of study. The opposite is not so: we cannot
view things objectively without any reference to use. Every objective quality is a quality in
reference to its function, its place in the world. There is no purely objective object of
contemplation; even if there were, let’s say the Good, its singular value (at least to us) would still
place it in our world even if we admit that it is beyond being, beyond our world.
Thus we learn two things from Heidegger’s insight: (1) zuhanden equipmentality is more
originary ontology that (2) grounds the vorhanden ontology of things as objects. The third
insight—the real upshot, perhaps, of this line of thought—is that meaning (or a part of meaning),
the more originary kind of meaning, is a meaning of doing, of use. The word “screwdriver”
doesn’t just mean some vorhanden definition found in a dictionary; on a deeper level,
“screwdriver” means this: the grasping of something in your hand while twisting it. A hammer is
38

a thing meant for hammering, that is, a thing for banging another thing with, especially if that
other thing is a nail. A forth derivative point is that there is a network of Zuhandenheit. We are
well aware of the network of signs and symbols made famous by the poststructuralists, but
Heidegger reveals a more originary web of zuhanden things: hammering implies nails and wood,
which implies building, which implies buildings, dwellings, where we dwell, live, living, life, the
world, etc.

Brandom’s Appropriation of Zu- and Vorhandenheit
Now it should be obvious, even if unwelcome to the orthodox Heideggerian, why
Brandom is so fond of Zu- and Vorhandenheit: he sees a pragmatic doing x as grounding the
meaning of that x, and he sees the implicit inferences as grounding the explicit inferences (the
pragmatic as grounding the abstract inferences). As Brandom puts it,
our practical nonconceptual dealings with things that form the necessary
background for understanding how it is possible for us to achieve the disinterested
representational perspective from which we judge or state how things
are…Vorhandensein is precipitated out of Zuhandensein—…the capacity to say
or think anything depends on our practical capacities to do things correctly or
incorrectly.86
So far so good, but here Brandom departs from Heidegger in a way that prevents the
possibility of animal minds. Vorhandenheit, as Brandom notes, is the realm of language, of
giving and asking for reasons. Animals lack this ability to operate in a public space of linguistic
rationality, and so, if they are to have any kind of mind or world, it must be confined to the realm
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of Zuhandenheit (if that term can be transferred to whatever animals do). I contest that minimally
we may infer that animals make implicit inferences, which is to say that they operate according
to Zuhandenheit (though not in the rich sense of Dasein whose Zuhandenheit is informed by
Vorhandenheit, as in the learning to drive stick shift); that is, I contest that if Brandom didn’t go
beyond Heidegger on this point, he would have a place for animal minds in his philosophy. But
Brandom explicitly rejects any Zuhandenheit apart from Vorhandenheit, and thus any space for
animal minds:
At this point it is tempting to see the world of equipment as autonomous, as
something that could be in place before, or otherwise in the absence of the
particular linguistic practices…. If that is right, then Heidegger is putting forward
a ‘layer cake’ picture of the relation between the two sorts of intentionality. …But
the layer cake picture cannot be right.87
Brandom believes that, contra Heidegger, Zuhandenheit is reciprocally dependent on
Vorhandenheit:
one might take it as a lesson of natural science that Zuhandensein is also reference
dependent on Vorhandensein: unless there were objective facts stateable in
assertions, there could not be any social practices at all. Since assertions…are a
special kind of equipment, it is obvious that nothing can show up to us as
vorhanden unless we are worlded.88
Brandom is asserting that social practice, a kind of Zuhandensein, is only possible if there are
things to be social about, namely a world in which to practice. But this is not a valid dismissal of
the primacy of Zuhandensein—as Brandom pointed out on the previous page: “We will not say
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that before we had the concepts there was no mass, no electrons, and so on.”89 What then is
Brandom getting at? In Chapter 11, he explicitly says that Vorhandenheit is necessary, because
otherwise “this account can be told about pre- or nonlinguistic creatures [animals], as
exemplifying an autonomous level of functioning on which the capacity for linguistic practice is
causally and conceptually parasitic.”90 Brandom recognizes that Heidegger’s prioritizing of
Zuhandenheit allows for animals to similarly engage the world in a fundamental way; for
Brandom, this is parasitic—no pun intended, I’m sure. Because Brandom refuses to allow for
animals to have rich, zuhanden engagement with the world, he makes Zu- and Vorhandenheit
reciprocally dependent, though Zuhandenheit remains the “first among equals” since
Zuhandensein links up with Mitdasein, another constitutive aspect of Dasein.91
Brandom argues that Heidegger must be committed to the reciprocal structure of, as he
puts it, implicit and explicit inferences, and indeed, at least in Being and Time, it appears that
Heidegger is very much committed to this reciprocal structure. Heidegger interprets the Greek
λόγος as “Rede,” which is translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as “discourse” or “talk,” as
distinct from “Sprache” (“language”) and from “Gerede” (“idle talk”). Thus “Dasein, man’s
Being, is ‘defined’ as the ζώον λόγον έχον—as that living thing whose Being is essentially
determined by the potentiality for discourse.”92 Heidegger is able to make this connection
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because λόγος, which refers to the man’s distinctive faculty of reason (Vernunft), shares the same
root as λέγειν, which means “to hold discourse,” or more generally, “laying out, exhibiting,
setting forth, recounting, telling a tale, making a statement.”93 Λογος, Heidegger notes, is also
tied to λεγόμενον:
Moreover, λόγος can signify the reason [Vernunft]. And because, moreover, λόγος
is used not only with the signification of λέγειν but also with that of λεγόμενον
(that which is exhibited, as such), and because the latter is nothing else than the
‘υποκείμενον which, as present-at-hand, already lies at the bottom [zum Grunde]
of any procedure of addressing oneself to it or discussing it, λόγος qua λεγόμενον
means the ground, the ratio…visible in its relation to something in its
‘relatedness’, λόγος acquires the signification of relation and relationship.94
Heidegger thus weds discourse and present-at-hand etymologically as a relationship unified in
reason. The present-at-hand grounds discourse but not, apparently, in the sensing of founding,
but in the sense of grounding, of Grund; the relationship between present-at-hand and discourse
isn’t causal or temporal but coeval. As Brandom would put it, reason is the relationship between
the implicit and the explicit, the ability to make explicit implicit truth.
Lest we miss the connection of language (discourse) to mind in Heidegger, which is so
troubling in Brandom, we must remember that “Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with
state-of-mind and understanding.”95 However, Heidegger follows this sentence with a stronger
claim, something seemingly opposite of what I am arguing in my thesis as a whole. Heidegger
seems to make “expliciting” (Brandom’s word) prior to any implicit truth (e.g. that math only
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has meaning or truth once Dasein makes it explicit): “The intelligibility of something has always
been articulated, even before there is any appropriative interpretation of it. Discourse is the
Articulation of intelligibility.”96 This is made clearer in the lecture course that culminated in
Being and Time. Heidegger says that
It is also a matter of fact that our simplest perception and constitutive states are
already expressed, even more, are interpreted in a certain way. What is primary
and original here? It is not so much that we see the objects and things but rather
that we first talk about them. To put it more precisely: we do not say what we see,
but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter.97
This characterization in The History of the Concept of Time shows that in perception, discourse
precedes perception for Dasein. Of course Being and Time is famously only an investigation of
the being that asks about Being; it is not an investigation of Being itself, but only inasmuch it’s
related to Dasein. This existential aspect of Being and Time seems to be lost on Brandom who
universalizes the relationship between discourse and present-at-hand truth. What a more careful
reading of Paragraph 34 shows is that it is only (as far as we know) true of Dasein that the
explicit and the implicit are reciprocally related. If we don’t take a superficial reading of
Heidegger, we see that Dasein shares with animals an originary connection to the world, which
we’ll discuss in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE:
HEIDEGGER’S SNAIL AND OTHER (WORLD-)POOR ANIMALS

Because plants and animals are lodged in their respective
environments but are never placed freely in the clearing of being
which alone is “world,” they lack language. But in being denied
language they are not thereby suspended wordlessly in their
environment.
Martin Heidegger98

Some philosophers like Descartes and, more recently Robert Brandom, brilliant as they
may be, seem entirely indifferent towards animals, as if animals in their own right are nothing
but our playthings or nature’s wild machines. On the other extreme, of course, are those from
Pythagoras to Peter Singer who insist that the way we humans view each other, namely our
ethical obligations towards one another, applies also to animals. Traditionally, the proper view of
animals lies in the middle: we don’t have moral obligations of the same kind towards animals
(and it’s certainly not reciprocal), but that does not make us indifferent towards them. The moral
mean, then, does not underestimate what distinguishes man from beast, nor does it underestimate
their commonalities. The early Heidegger’s topology of beings follows this traditional schema.
Even within the traditional centrist position, however, people tend to gravitate towards
the extremes of similarity and difference. What one takes as an example of “animal” usually
betrays this bias. David Farrell Krell, for instance, is fond of discussing horses vis-à-vis
Dasein—horses, those enlightened creatures that make us look like yahoos, are a domesticated
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animal, and their features are inevitably cast in the shadow of man (be it through evolutionary
history, cultural history, military history, etc.).99 Krell doesn’t talk about the whiteness of the
whale or of the tyger tyger, burning bright. Of course, poets have their own aesthetic reasons for
choosing the animals they do in their works. Philosophers, however, must choose their examples
for—shall we say—metaphysical reasons. Indeed, Heidegger’s most explicit examples of
animals as animals are the lizard and the bee in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.
The lizard and the bee are a far cry from the horses of Krell or the popular examples of
“my dog,”100 much to Krell’s chagrin. However, Heidegger’s more exotic and yet more common
example of an animal in his early work, is, I shall argue, more interesting and more insightful—
he chooses that pest, that delicacy, that alien of an animal, the snail.101 In this chapter we will
also discuss Heidegger’s (world-)poor animals, the lizard and the bee. Necessarily, we will at the
same time clarify what it is to be Dasein. Both we and the animal interact and engage directly
with the world, but just what this world is or means to us and the animal remains to be seen.
Let us begin with the concept of a world, and then progress to the lizards and the bees of
The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. The lynchpin of the discussion, however, will come
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at the end when we see the intimate connection between Dasein and the snail through a close
reading of The History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena.

The World (Not as Will or Representation—or Materialism)
There are two extremes of world that Heidegger is explicitly working against which can
be summed up as a parody of Schopenhauer’s magnum opus (also very much opposed by
Heidegger): the world is not a place of vitalism or mystical dynamism, either in the sense of
romantics like Schopenhauer and the early Nietzsche, or in the sense of psychological or egoistic
individualism in vogue during Heidegger’s time, especially that of Husserl and Scheler; neither
is the world a representation of our minds or of a mind, as diverse people have thought from
Plato and Augustine to Descartes, Berkeley, and Kant. Neither does Heidegger think that a
scientific materialism can get anywhere close to the truth of things. He thus refuses to play the
game of idealism or realism (pick your poison), and calls the bluff: we are already beings-in-theworld (something idealism overlooks),102 and we are beings who ask after being (something
scientific realism can’t account for). Instead of these flawed categories, Heidegger thinks of our
interaction in the world in terms of Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit, in terms of a direct, handy
engagement with the world and in terms of an abstract, present-at-hand (dis)engagement with the
world.
Such an analysis of our being-in-the-world, though profound, leaves unanswered the
question of the world as world, the world in which we have our being, the world that worlds.

102

See, for example, Prolegomena., 166-167.
46

Heidegger attempts to understand world three times and in three different ways in his early work
(and continues to try in his later work): first in Being and Time, then in “On the Essence of
Grounds,” and then in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. For our purposes, it will
suffice to discuss world as Heidegger presents it in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.

The World of Phusis through Logos
One way of thinking about the world is as nature, as the natural world. By this we do not
mean the world as described by the natural sciences, the material world, so to speak. Rather by
world Heidegger means phusis in the rich sense of the ancient Greeks, of “growing, growth, that
which has itself grown in such growth”; “Growing is all this taken together as one.”103 Phusis is
the “self-forming prevailing of beings as a whole.”104 The world is thus an unfolding of being(s).
But there is a more specific form of world that is particular to Dasein, namely the world
that he forms. Dasein is thus not merely a part of the world: Dasein has and makes a world;
Dasein partitions and partakes in world-forming.
[M]an is not simply regarded as a part of the world within which he appears and
which he makes up a part [as with animals]. Man also stands over against the
world. This standing-over-against is a ‘having’ of world as that in which man
moves, with which he engages, which he both masters and serves, and to which
he is exposed. Thus man is, first, a part of the world, and second, as this part he is
at once both master and servant of the world.105
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The way that Dasein forms a world is tied to his having logos. Logos, generally translated as
reason, is linked etymologically to logein, “speaking.” Thus for Heidegger, logos is primarily a
speaking out, a making it explicit in discourse. The “it” here is phusis: “Man, insofar as he exists
as man, has always already spoken out about phusis.”106
There is a close relationship between phusis and logos, between world and discursive
world-forming, and thus a special relationship between Dasein and the world: “Phusis means this
whole prevailing that prevails through man himself, a prevailing that he does not have power
over, but which precisely prevails through and around him—him, man, who has always already
spoken out about this.”107 Dasein is the being that speaks the world, who uncovers the world.
Thus we arrive at Heidegger’s definition of truth: a-letheia, un-concealing. Animals don’t have
the ability to make the world explicit. Therefore animals do not have a world (as Dasein does),
though this does not mean they are utterly worldless (like a stone); they have some kind of
world, and so Heidegger settles on calling them “world-poor,” “Weltarmut.” We have the
following formation, which we’ll discuss in the next section: “[T]he stone (material object) is
worldless; the animal is poor in world; man is world-forming.”108
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The Lizards and the Bees—(World-)Poor Animals!
Animals are not simply world-less, as is the case with stones, for certainly animals
engage the world in a way that rocks cannot (though some, like Descartes and Brandom, seem to
miss the import of this phenomenological fact). There is a distinction between worldlessness of a
stone and an animal’s poverty of world: “the stone cannot even be deprived of something like a
world.”109 A stone is not like a lizard on a stone, just as a lizard lying on a stone is not like a
hand on a head.110 That is, material things are as different from animals as animals are from
Dasein. Stones simply don’t have access to beings as beings, and this is how Heidegger wants us
to understand the world in its minimal, “poor” sense, as “the accessibility of beings.”111 Stones
have no access to beings, let alone being; stones do not engage phusis, let alone make phusis
known through logos.
Animals are more than stones in that that they engage other beings in the world. As we’ll
see in the next section, this engagement is a minimal kind of Zuhandenheit, but already we can
see how animals relate to the world directly. The lizard, for instance, “has sought out this stone”
in order to bask in the sun.112 Though we must be careful how we go about this, we are not
projecting anything when we recognize a kind of intentionality here, a directedness-towards, an
in-order-to:
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Every animal as animal has a specific set of relationships to its sources of
nourishment, its prey, its enemies, its sexual mates, and so on. These
relationships, which are infinitely difficult for us to grasp and require a high
degree of caution and methodological foresight on our part, have a peculiar
fundamental character of their own, the metaphysical significance of which has
never properly been perceived or understood before.113
Animals even have a kind of automatic engagement with the world, akin to das Man, in their (at
times) unnoticing engagement with their world.114
Simpler animals like the bee also have a kind of (impoverished) world, full of intimate
relationships with other beings. Indeed, even “A very primitive unicellular form of life…will
already find itself, where this disposition can be the greatest and darkest dullness, but for all that
it is in its structure of being essentially distinct from merely being on hand like a [strictly
material] thing.”115 Unlike most thinkers who discuss animals with a bias towards higher order
animals, preferencing animals with high intelligence or the ability to feel pain, Heidegger bites
the bullet and means by animal all animals. Indeed, his inclusion of unicellular life forms as
animals indicates why he includes plants under the category of life and why he often mentions
the two in the same sentence, seemingly indiscriminately. Thus, we may also include plants in
the following sentence: “The animal’s way of being, which we call ‘life’, is not without access to
what is around it and about it [noch neben ihm ist],” though this access may be severely limited,
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especially for plants and unicellular organisms.116 Indeed, this limited access, this confinement,
as he calls it, indicates the poverty of world for animals. That we can liken animals to plants
shows how poor their world is. But we can be more precise than this.
Although animals experience the world, they do not experience the world as world.
This is Heidegger’s central point in his discussion of animals in The Fundamental Concepts of
Metaphysics:
The bee, for example, has its hive, its cells, the blossoms it seeks out, and the
other bees of the swarm. The bee’s world is limited to a specific domain and is
strictly circumscribed….But it is not merely the world of each particular animal
that is limited in range—the extent and manner in which an animal is able to
penetrate whatever is accessible to it is also limited. The worker bee is familiar
with the blossoms it frequents, along with their colour and scent, yet it does not
know the stamens of these blossoms as stamens, it knows nothing of the roots of
the plant.117
Poor in world means deprived of world. Animals are thus infinitely removed from humans, not
just in the range of our possible experiences (the what), but, more essentially, in the very
possibility of experiencing the world as world (the how).
As against this [animal poverty of world], the world of man is a rich one,
…constantly extendable not only in range…but also in respect to the manner in
which we can penetrate ever more deeply in this penetrability. Consequently we
can characterize the relation man possesses to the world by referring to the
extendibility of everything that he relates to. This is why we speak of man as
world-forming.118
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We have now seen how Heidegger distinguishes the world-forming man, Dasein, from
the world-poor animals. What remains for us is to look at animals from the other perspective, to
see how much of the world and our way of relating to it is shared with animals.

The Shared Zuhanden World
If Heidegger uses the bees and lizards to differentiate man from beast, then in the
Prolegomena he uses the snail to showcase what links Dasein and other animals. Heidegger uses
the snail as an example of how we are already in the world: just like the snail in its shell is
already in the world, so too, even if we could crawl into our minds, our minds would still be in
the world. (The world is not in our consciousness, as Husserl would put it; our consciousness is
in the world.) The snail analogy, as we shall see, is no mere analogy, but a telling account of
animal-being in the world.119 But first a word on the vocabulary of Prolegomena.

The Vocabulary of the Prolegomena
In the lectures that would become Being and Time, Heidegger’s approach is quite
different: he begins with a long discussion and criticism of Husserl (and other phenomenologists)
before getting to the material that would make up the bulk of Being and Time. While this
phenomenological approach, rather than the more existentially oriented approach of Being and
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Time, is helpful for realizing Heidegger’s debt to Husserl, for our purposes it portrays the now
familiar insights of Being and Time in a different light that enables us to see crucial Heideggerian
concepts for what they are, that is, apart from any stale interpretations or understandings that
may have become entrenched in our minds or even in the literature.
One striking divergence from Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation is that Theodore
Kisiel translates zuhanden as “handy” (not “ready-to-hand”) and vorhanden primarily as “on
hand” (not “present-at-hand”). Vorhandenheit as “on hand” reads remarkably different than
“present-at-hand” would in the text—it sounds almost zuhanden, and this, it would seem, is
intentional. Although the Prolegomena is the first place Heidegger clearly distinguishes
Zuhandenes from Vorhandenes,120 the distinction is still fluid enough that the use of
Vorhandenheit often sounds handy in the text, and so Kisiel is probably trying to capture this
more immediate Vorhandenheit with his translation of it as “on hand.” (He also translates dabei
as “on hand,” as we shall see.) Here are Kisiel’s comments on the use of Vorhandenheit leading
up to Being and Time:
Vorhandenheit (prepresence, on-handness, presence at hand) – First used
terminologically to describe the “already there in advance” in which the aroundworld is disclosed, and so not yet distinguished from the “handy” (GA 63:97; also
November 1924). In fact, so unresolved is this term in November 1924 that even
the facticity of the “I am,” its “that it is,” is described in terms of its “being on
hand.” The more subtle analysis in SS 1925 of the levels of immediate presence
first yields the clear distinction in modes of encounter and disclosedness between
the handy (Zuhandenes) and the on-hand things (Vorhandenes) against the
background presence of the environing world. 121
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Again, although the distinction is made “clear” in the Prolegomena, Vorhandenheit
remains relatively originary, lacking the ontological separation and dependence on Zuhandenheit
we see in Being and Time. It is Erkennen, “knowing,” that is “a founded way of being-in-theworld, a way that is always possible only on the basis of non-cognitive comportment.”122 Though
“knowing [Erkennen] is not on hand [vorhanden]” in the Prolegomena,123 the role of Erkennen is
usually what is meant by Vorhandenheit in Being and Time (or at least in traditional readings of
Being and Time)124. In the Prolegomena, vorhanden has a more visceral ontology, it is on hand,
rather than as a abstract ontology, say of chemistry or lexicography, that we see in Being and
Time. Nonetheless, Vorhandensein does sometimes indicate beings in a being-in relationship, as
water is in a glass.125 Animals however, are not beings-in, as we shall see.

In-Being: The Snail in its Haus, in its World
Heidegger stresses “a basic constitutive state” of Dasein is “being-in-the-world” in the
sense of being “unified” and “originary.”126 The first aspect of being in the world is not our focus
here, though it is important to keep in mind that Dasein is wholly there in the world and
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apprehends the world as a whole (there is no Cartesian separation from the world, no sub specie
aeternitatis; the world is given as whole, and we are “in” that world as part of it holistically, not
in terms of realism or idealism.) More to the topic at hand, Dasein’s originary position is in the
world. This “in-being” involves being in relation to the world, to other beings in the world; we
are “in” a space of reference.
This spatiality is not like a “spatial container,” like “being-in” something as water is in a
glass; rather, it is a rich sense of space as world.
‘In’ comes from innan, which means to dwell, habitare; ‘ann’ means: I am
accustomed, I am familiar with, I take care of something—the Latin colo in the
sense of habito and diligo. Dwelling is also taken here as taking care of something
in intimate familiarity, being-involved-with [Sein-bei].127
Theodore Kisiel extends the translation of Sein-bei to “in intimate familiarity, being-involvedwith” for good reason, for this is precisely what Heidegger is getting at in this passage, and we
lack a word like the French “chez” that can capture the German “bei.” And “bei” is crucial for
our topic, as we’ll see as we continue with the text.
This same entity which we characterize as in-being we also define, as I have
already said, as the entity that I am [bin]; and “bin” is connected with “bei.” “I
am” thus amounts to saying, I dwell, I abide in the world as with something
familiar.128
Here, interestingly enough, in-being is connected with dwelling in the world, in relation to other
beings that are da-bei, beings for which we have concern. In-being is part of everydayness, it has
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“the character of concern.”129 As we may have guessed, Dasein is an in-being; in fact, “In-being
is rather the constitution of the being of Dasein, in which every way of being of this entity is
grounded.”130
Does this mean that Dasein is the only in-being? Initially it would seem so, since
Heidegger next links up Erkennen (“knowing”) with Dasein’s in-being: “knowing [Erkennen] the
world is a mode of being of Dasein such that this mode is ontically founded in its basic
constitution, in being-in the-world.”131 And in the larger context, Heidegger is attempting to
show that any object-subject Erkennen is already grounded in being-in-the-world; if Erkennen is
in mente, in some “Gehäuse” or “box,”132 then that box itself in the world. But to show this,
Heidegger introduces the snail and its shell—its Gehäuse, its Haus—which links up the animal
in-being with Dasein in-being.133
Gehäuse is the German word for the shell of snails and the like, but also of radios,
cameras and other such things in the sense of “casing” or “box” or even “housing.” This last
sense makes clear the word’s connection with its root, Haus. Indeed, besides an archaic use of
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Gehäuse to mean a shelter [Behausung],134 Heidegger himself makes this connection explicit by
using both Haus to mean shell and shell to mean Haus. As he begins the snail analogy, it is “[die]
Schnecke in ihrem Haus” and then “Schneckengehäuse” in the next sentence; on the next page it
is “Die Schnecke kriecht zuweilen aus ihrem Gehäuse,” “sie im Gehäuse ist,” “Sie ist in ihrem
Haus,” “sie hat das Innen ihres Hauses als Welt,” and simply “im Haus.”135 Clearly Heidegger is
playing off of the Haus in Gehäuse. But what for? Heidegger is emphasizing that the snail dwells
in the world. We can see this in many ways, as I shall try to make clear.
Heidegger connects the snail to Dasein by saying that when it stretches out of its shell to
get something, it “at the same time keeps it on hand” (“behält es dabei zugleich”).136 Just above
in the section before (§19), Heidegger connects bei with bin, with dwelling, with in-being. The
snail dwells in its Haus, it dwells in the world— da-bei, both there-by and here-by. The duality
of da should recall that of da in Da-sein. Indeed, the snail, unlike the glass of water, “has the
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mode of being of Dasein, it is such that it has a world” (“es eine Welt hat”).137 That we can be
sure Heidegger means the snail here and not Dasein by analogy is made clear in the first sentence
after this paragraph: “This [analogy] applies similarly to a subject to which knowing [Erkennen]
is ascribed,” i.e. to an animal with knowing (properly speaking), i.e. Dasein, which means we
have been talking about the snail specifically.138 The snail therefore has “a” world, though not
knowledge (and we will return to this later).139
We’ve already mentioned but passed over too quickly another way in which we are
meant to understand the snail as connected to Dasein inasmuch as they both have a world, inbeing, etc., namely that the snail “is not in its shell like water in the glass.”140 Water in a glass is
one of Heidegger’s examples from the previous section (§19) of “being-in” as opposed to the inbeing of Dasein and (we may now add) the snail.141 Indeed, just as the snail stands for the
animal, so too the water in the glass stands for the stone, the material, lifeless thing, which has no
world, no in-being, only being-in.
Thus we see the snail as in between the stone and Dasein, and more akin to Dasein. Its
shell (Gehäuse), that material stone-like thing, that Korper, is kept dabei as a Haus, a dwelling
with which it interacts. It also interacts directly with the world; indeed, is always “already-in-the-
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world” (“Schon-seins-in-der-Welt”).142 Thus we see why the analogy “is not too far removed
from the matter at issue, inasmuch as this analogy is concerned with an entity to which we must
likewise attribute, in a formal way, the kind of being which belongs to Dasein—‘life.’”143
What then is this life? It is the “primary…non-cognitive comportment” (“primäre...nicht
erkennden Verhattung”) towards the world.144 This non-cognitive apprehension (Erfassen) is
grounded by a “letting-something-be-encountered, and this is possible only on the basis of
always already being-involved-with” (“immer schon Seins-bei”).145 The connection between
Dasein and the snail here, again, is that the snail in its shell is analogous to Dasein inside itself
(in mente)—just as the snail crept out to get and bring back food but never really get out of itself,
out of its shell (Gehäuse), so too Dasein doesn’t go outside itself and return with “booty” to the
“‘housing’ [‘Gehäuse’] of consciousness.”146 The Gehäuse of consciousness or of the snail is
already-in-the-world. Even in the case of consciousness, of Dasein who knows, this knowing is
“a founded way of being-in-the-world.”147 “All knowing [Erkennen] is only an appropriation and
a form of realization of something which is already discovered by other primary comportments,”
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i.e. primary, non-cognitive comportments.148 Showing Dasein’s primary comportment as that of
the animal’s is Heidegger’s motivation for the snail analogy: Dasein is an in-being, and
Erkennen does not precede or explain its originary position in the world as an in-being; rather
Erkennen is rooted in the primary, non-cognitive comportment to the world, the world of the
snail.
Erkennen, however, cannot merely be added to in-being to go from animal to Dasein.149
Instead, Heidegger advocates “a phased structure” of Erkennen in which the founded forms of
knowledge—namely, Vernehmen (perception), Wissen (knowing/understanding), and
Wissenschaft (science) and Forschung (research)—are grounded in the “primary” forms of
knowledge, namely “directing-itself-toward something” (“das Sichrichten-auf etwas”) and
“dwelling-with” (“Sichaufhalten-bei”).150 Thus Dasein alone has Erkennen in the full sense, in
the sense of Vernehmen, Wissen, and Forschung, but this only inasmuch as Dasein shares
directedness-towards and dwelling-with—primary Erkennen—with the snail.
Heidegger’s phased structure of knowledge—of animal minds—is underdeveloped in his
work, but Mark Okrent takes up the task of fleshing out a Heideggerian structure of animal
minds in his work, Rational Animals, to which we turn in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
THINKING ANIMALS, THOUGHT-FUL HUMANS

[P]hilosophical theories about what it is that distinguishes
members of our species from other animal species…may seem to
provide grounds for the belief that our rationality as thinking
beings is somehow independent of our animality. We become in
consequence forgetful of our bodies and of how our thinking is the
thinking of one species of animal.
Alasdair MacIntyre151

In this final chapter I hope to walk a narrow line: I wish to show that we can understand
animal rationality without ascribing to them any kind of linguistic mental states while assuming
that it is precisely language that allows us to understand how animals think. The distinction, as
Norman Malcolm explains, is that there is an important difference between thinking and having a
thought. Since keeping straight thinking from having thoughts is central to this chapter, it’s
worth quoting Malcolm at length here:
In real life we commonly employ the verb “think” in respect to animals. We say,
“Towser thinks he is going to be fed,” just as naturally as we say, “Towser wants
to be fed.” Suppose our dog is chasing the neighbor's cat. The latter runs full tilt
toward an oak tree, but suddenly swerves at the last moment and disappears up a
nearby maple. The dog doesn't see this maneuver and on arriving at the oak tree
he rears up on his hind legs, paws the trunk as if trying to scale it, and barks
excitedly into the branches above. We who observe the whole episode from a
window say, “He thinks that the cat went up that oak tree.” …A million examples
could be produced in which it would be a correct way of speaking to say of an
animal, something of the form, “He thinks that p.” … We should, in contrast, feel
reluctant and embarrassed to say, “He had the thought that the cat went up the oak
tree.” In referring to an animal, it is natural enough to say, “He thought that p,”
but not, “He had the thought that p….
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One way of stating the interest of this distinction is to say that although we
apply the word "think" to animals, using it as a transitive verb taking a
propositional phrase as its object, we do not thereby imply that the animal
formulated or thought of a proposition, or had a proposition "before its mind." In
saying something about the animal, we employ a verb that, grammatically, takes a
propositional expression as object, without meaning that as a matter of
psychological fact the animal thought of a proposition. The next point to see is
that we employ the verb "think" in the same way in regard to people. On the basis
of circumstances and behavior we say that a man "thought that p," without
implying that he thought of p or formulated p, or that p occurred to him or was in
his thoughts. For example, suppose a friend of mine and I are engrossed in an
exciting conversation. We are about to drive off in his car. While holding up his
end of the conversation he fumbles in his pocket for the car keys. I, knowing that
they are in the glove compartment, say to myself, "He thinks the keys are in his
pocket." I do not imply that he said to himself, or thought to himself, "The keys
are in my pocket." Grammatical form is no index of psychological reality. 152
Malcolm agrees that animals can’t have thoughts because they don’t have language, but that
doesn’t mean that animals don’t think. According to him, this kind of thinking needn’t even be
propositional—humans often think in non-propositional ways. Recognizing a friend across the
street, for instance, is a kind of thinking that isn’t propositional.153 We don’t think, “if that is in
fact Kasper, then I have seen Kasper,” we simply see Kasper. (This phenomenological reality is
expressed by Heidegger as Zuhandenheit, prior to and not dependent upon Vorhandenheit; we
must have this intuitive engagement with the world before we can abstract it into language and
proposition, not the other way around.) Descartes’ problem, according to Malcolm, was that all
thought for him was propositional and all propositions were linguistic;154 Macintyre says that this
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bias towards mental content in terms of language continues to be the problem for twentiethcentury philosophers like Brandom.155
Brandom, however, unlike Descartes, separates (at least formally) language from
propositions: language is the capacity of explicating (“expliciting”) the implicit, which we may
understand as the unarticulated metaphysical or logical structure of things. In the previous
chapters I’ve tried to show how animals have an implicit understanding of the world apart from
language; in this chapter, by way of conclusion, I hope to show that we can explicate animals’
implicit understanding of the world through language without ascribing to them such forms of
cogitation. First, I will show how Mark Okrent gives us the tools to understand higher-order
animals in terms of goal-directedness, something shared with lower-order animals, even nonrational animals. This is better than thinking of higher-order animals as quasi-linguistic, since
that position is defeasible and fuzzy, whereas we can clearly understand higher-order animals in
terms of lower-ordered animals, even non-rational ones. Next I will show how Heidegger gives
us this paradigm while insisting where Okrent equivocates that only humans have linguistic, selfconscious rationality. Lastly, I’ll show how, because of language, we can accurately describe
what animals do, all the while without ascribing language to them.
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Okrent’s Teleological Understanding of Animal Behavior
The last thing we want to do when talking about animals is to anthropomorphize them.
We don’t want to be philosophical “bitees,” people who, according to Vicki Hearne, “are
contaminated by [their] epistemology…they cast about for some premise from which they can
draw an inference that will give them certainty about the dog’s behavior,” certainty about their
own assumptions. We need to be careful not to project our epistemology onto animals lest we be
bitten by our own assumptions, begging the question.
The danger of projecting onto animals is easy to fall into if we take a commonsense view
of epistemology and the problem of other minds—it would seem like this animal is
contemplating, so it must have thoughts, because when I contemplate, I contemplate thoughts.
While the argument from analogy and best explanation may hold for the problem of other human
minds, we can’t be sure the analogy holds for animals—it certainly doesn’t for all animals; and
the best explanation for animal minds would be based on what we do know—how evolution and
circumstance determine and affect animal behavior—rather than what we don’t know—the
relationship between mind and body, between language and intentionality, between natural
desire and will, etc. Okrent’s solution doesn’t depend on any questionable epistemological or
phenomenological experience, it simply depends on scientifically observable facts of animal
nature and behavior. Resting on biology and basic phenomenological observation, Okrent’s
philosophy of animal minds is no more suspect as a theory than the theory of evolution upon
which he draws.
The argument for animal minds by analogy to that of humans is essentially the
functionalist’s argument; Mark Okrent heavily criticizes this view of animal minds, and instead
64

provides a layered-cake view of rationality, a hierarchy of more sophisticated kinds of rationality
built upon less sophisticated kinds of rationality, ultimately founded on rudimentary, nonrational goal-directed behavior. He explains how a teleological account of intentionality can
make sense of animal minds by way of what makes for rational, normative action without falling
into a the hermeneutic circle of behaviorism. What we appeal to is not the behavior itself—any
behavior—but normative behavior—what’s appropriate for that animal to do. At base, this
normativity is a biological or evolutionary teleology.
Recall the Sphex wasp from earlier: the wasp has a series of goals by virtue of being a
wasp, namely survival and reproduction, and the ability to achieve these goals. We can say that
the wasp has reasons to do what it does: there is a reason why it checks the hole before putting
the caterpillar in there—to make sure there’s no predator waiting for a free lunch. But the wasp is
not cognizant of such reasons, and so Okrent claims they are nonrational: “The behavior of the
wasp has a goal, even if it is not the result of any rational thought on the part of the wasp. So
causation by the beliefs and desires of the agent can’t be part of what it is for the behavior to
have a goal.”156 Thus the behaviorist is wrong to assume beliefs and desires from behavior,
because the wasp doesn’t have beliefs and desires though it has goals. Okrent is establishing the
fact that goal-directedness does not depend on beliefs and desires, thus there is no circle of
causality, but rather an objective standard or norm, against which we can evaluate behavior.
Conformity to the teleological good for Okrent is the normative base by which we can evaluate
animal behavior.
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Rationality, Mental Content, and Okrent’s Linguistic Bias
Intentionality—by which Okrent means (mental) beliefs and desires—is understood as
fundamentally good-directed behavior, and what makes the behavior good or not is whether it is
normatively appropriate in light of evolutionary (general) and circumstantial (specific) goals.
Okrent sees himself as showing the instrumental roots of intentionality, just as Heidegger
showed the more basic Zuhandenheit as foundational for Vorhandenheit. But while Heidegger is
careful to reserve any kind of discursivity from animals, Okrent’s emphasis on intentionality in
higher-order animals betrays a linguistic bias towards rationality that both ostracizes lower-order
animals and minimizes the difference between animal and human intentionality. Based on his
own arguments for lower-order animals, however, we do not need to ascribe linguistic mental
content to higher-order animals, even if they do display sophisticatedly rational intentionality.
Okrent credits his thesis to the Heidegger of Being and Time, though he departs from
Heidegger in two ways. Okrent agrees with Heidegger “that no agent could possess
understanding unless it was capable of acting in order to achieve some end or goal,”157 but
Okrent argues that “Creatures that are not Dasein act in order to achieve ends.”158 This, however,
is not really in disagreement with Heidegger. According to Theodore Kisiel,
understanding [Verstehen] is first identified in KNS [Kriegsnotsemester] 1919 as
a ‘hermeneutic intuition’ (ZBP [Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie, GA 56/57]
117) based on nonreflective experiencing of experience; this is regarded as a kind
of ‘sympathy’ (ZBP 110) that life has of itself…understanding is more an
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accompanying familiarity that comes with life itself, giving access to its sense and
context.159
Not until Verstehen is linked with Seinverstehändnis in Prolegomena (SS 1925) do we get a kind
of understanding as self-understanding that gives rise to the question of being.160 Indeed, Kiesel
points out that the “emphasis on the projection of possibility [in understanding] emerges only in
BT [Being and Time] itself.”161 Being and Time, of course, is primarily about the being of
Dasein, and, as we discussed in the Introduction to this thesis, Heidegger’s conception of animal
understanding and the distinctive aspects of Dasein’s understanding are perfectly consistent. The
distinctive aspects of Dasein’s particular form of understanding, e.g. self-understanding and
contemplation of counterfactuals, does not preclude nor ignore nondiscursive understanding;
human understanding, however, is what allows us to understand understanding, to have world, to
be world-forming.
Heidegger, therefore, would not take issue with Okrent on understanding in animals, but
he would take issue with extending the distinctively human aspects of understanding, reflexive
and futural mental content, to higher-order animals. Indeed, this is why, as we discussed last
chapter, Heidegger chooses the most animal of animals as his examples, to show the “abysmal
bodily kinship with the beast”: he wants to show how other the animal is as animal, so that when
we see the similarities between us and dolphins or dogs, we don’t forget the “abyss” that
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separates us.162 Okrent, in giving animals mental content, has built a bridge to nowhere across
the abyss. (We’ll discuss this below.)
Okrent’s second divergence is similar: Dasein, he says, can only be understood as a “kind
of rational animal,” albeit a “distinctive” one, that is “intelligible only as modifications of
simpler [life]forms; Heidegger explicitly says that “Dasein is never to be defined ontologically
by regarding it as life…plus something else.”163 While Okrent’s position sounds nice and
current, it’s actually much harder to defend. Heidegger doesn’t have to give an account of how
language and self-understanding arise evolutionarily since that’s simply the mechanism to ask
such metaphysical questions, and it’s nonsensical to ask how that ability arose—we’re simply
thrown into such a position. Since Okrent is trying to build from the evolutionary bottom up, he
must offer some account of how language and self-consciousness arise, and this is a much harder
position to defend than the straightforward Heideggerian position. By implicitly insisting that
animals have linguistic mental content, Okrent has committed himself to an inexplicable
phenomenon; I hope to show why, by his own arguments about lower-order animals, we don’t
need to ascribe linguistic mental content in order to meaningfully ascribe intentionality to higherorder animals.
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Problems with Okrent’s Account of Animal Minds
Okrent argues that “the kind of highly definite intentional contents characteristic of
human action and intentionality are related to and arise out of the merely instrumental rationality
and vague mental contents characteristic of nonlinguistic animals,” and yet his view of animal
intentionality closely resembles that of human intentionality. 164 Quasi-discursive mental states
are unlikely and unfalsifiable for a number of reasons which I’ll discuss below; for now, let’s
review his general hierarchy of animal minds and what he means by rationality.
There are four categories of mind in Okrent’s reckoning: nonrational, biological behavior
(evolutionarily determined goals), intentionality (individually determined goals), social-reason
(group-determined goals), and human (self-determining goals). As we move up this great chain
of rationality, animals in the higher categories have all the more basic kinds of (non)rationality,
but these are teleologically subservient to their dominant or characteristic type. For example, the
goals of the social animal are not merely concerned with its own (or its children’s) welfare; the
goals of survival, reproduction, etc. remain, but they are now secondary to the goals of the
group.165 Humans are unique in that our rationality is governed by goals that we ourselves
(personally, but also in the context of a discursive, and we might add, already existing
community) decide are the goals we wish to pursue. We are the authors, so to speak, of the
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normativity that governs rational human behavior; or to put it more precisely, the human
teleology is to determine our own teleology.166
Barring such distinctly human exceptions, animals are rational if they normatively act
towards individual and species-specific goals, and, for Okrent, such individual goals must be
intentional—corresponding to beliefs and desires167—and they must be able to adapt to novel
situations, revising both beliefs and desires. It’s unclear, however, why these are necessary
conditions for rationality. The problem with his account of intentionality is that it is implicitly
discursive; adaptivity is a quantitative, not qualitative difference between wasps and birds;
idiosyncratic goals (meaning goals actively determined by the agent),168 similarly, are quantitatively,
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not qualitatively, different than more basic goals and behavior, especially individually-tailored ones
like flight, feeding, and reproduction.
Okrent links rationality with “intentional contents, such as beliefs and desires…[and]
versatile adaptive behavior that varies in response to changing circumstances, responds effectively to
the source of the agent’s mistakes, and is novel in relation to the agent’s species-specific patterns of
life.”169 Furthermore, to be “rational,” an animal must have “unique, changing, and idiosyncratic
goals and perceptions of the world, states that need not be shared with other members of its
species.”170 But don’t wasps fit this category in a very minimal sense? Okrent here echoes the
Cartesian view of sensation and behavior: some behavior is merely the mechanical response to
sensation, some behavior is guided by or determined by the will. The only difference is that Okrent
has allowed all animals except those like wasps to be in both categories, whereas Descartes allowed
only humans to have both kinds of behavior. Okrent now just grants that other animals besides
humans have propositional content, beliefs and desires. Animal intentionality—if it’s idiosyncratic
and sufficiently versatile—is now the requirement, not a human soul. But again, machines are not a
sufficient analogy for animals like wasps. Let’s discuss this problem generally before showing how it
betrays a discursive bias towards mental content.
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Rationality: Descriptive, not Ascriptive; Quantitative, not Qualitative
The problem with Okrent’s view of rationality as necessarily involving intentional
content is that it is an implicitly discursive view of mind: our mental content is discursive, but
it’s indefensible to assume animals have similar mental content. Rationality is a category of
ascription, not a state of mind. We can’t know whether animals have mental content that
“provide reasons for what they do” without again anthropomorphizing them, confusing thinking
with thoughts.171 Based on what Okrent has shown us about wasps and teleology, we are not
anthropomorphizing when we ascribe to them goals of which they are (he supposes) unaware;
but are we really to suppose that the other animals are aware of their goals—individual, social,
or biological? Okrent oversteps here and is asserting something indefensible without needing to.
We already have the mechanism by which to understand animal behavior as rational because of
the Sphex wasp—if only we grant that the wasp can be described as rational.
Why not call the wasp’s actions rational (without implying it has thoughts or even thinks)
if we can describe it as goal-directed even though it has no concept of its goals? (Similarly, if
animals don’t need to express intentionality linguistically to have rationality, according to
Okrent, why must we assume they have intentionality at all—isn’t goal-directedness enough? I’ll
return to this later.) This logic is obvious to MacIntyre: “To ascribe goods to dolphins makes it
natural to ascribe to them reasons for doing much that they do.”172 He goes on to quote Warren
Quinn: “a reason to act in a certain way is nothing more than something good in itself that it [the
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action] realizes or serves, or, short of that, something bad in itself that it avoids.”173 Notice that
neither MacIntyre nor Quinn makes any mention of beliefs and desires, let alone idiosyncratic
and adaptive goals; all animals act rationally if they act in accord with the normative teleology
appropriate to the animal.
Okrent grants that “all goal-directed organic behavior is reliably responsive to local
differences in the environment of the agent,” but “Only…instrumentally rational agents, who
alter the goals of their immediate acts and alter their acts so as to succeed in novel circumstances,
can properly be said to have reasons for what they do.”174 Why? Okrent says that
[instrumentally rational animals] act for proximate goals that are not fixed by their
species-defined life processes. This difference allows instrumentally rational
agents to respond successfully to alterations or details in their environments for
which no routine response is programmed in the life pattern of the species to
which they belong.175
What would make for a goal that’s not fixed by species-defined life processes? Okrent only
explains this negatively: “as soon as something unique, unexpected, or simply incapable of
sensible differentiation by wasps turns up in the environment, the individual wasp is at a loss.”176
He gives the example of how moving the caterpillar while the wasp is in the burrow will make
the wasp start chain of behavior over again, effectively getting stuck in a loop. But wouldn’t any
animal be at a loss if it encountered something it couldn’t comprehend or deal with? Even if we
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grant that flexible, adaptive richness is a meaningful distinction between higher and lower
animals, are we sure it’s not a quantitative difference instead a qualitative difference? 177 Okrent
insists it’s a qualitative difference, though he often compares the wasp and the bird in
quantitative terms (e.g., “a very small range of options” versus “numerous behavioral forks”).178
For instance, one easy way to test your dog’s intelligence is to have him sit and swiftly throw a
small blanket or large towel over his head: the faster the dog escapes, the more intelligent he is;
but a dog that just lies there, while not particularly bright, doesn’t cease to be rational, just like
infant animals who can’t yet account for various experiences aren’t thus labeled nonrational; to
affirm this would be to fall back into behaviorism.
What’s at issue here is confusing success of an action with appropriateness of an action—
a distinction Okrent made as early as Chapter 2. What makes teleological behavior normative is
whether it’s appropriate behavior, not whether the behavior in question itself is successful,
though what makes it appropriate has to do with a tending towards or statistical likelihood of
successful goal completion. Okrent therefore contradicts himself in saying that the wasp is not
rational “because of her failure to respond appropriately to the scientist’s intervention.”179
Appropriate upon what grounds? She is acting appropriately according to the goals and means to
achieve those goals of wasps: (1) dig burrow—(2) sting caterpillar—(3) bring caterpillar to edge
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of burrow—(4) check burrow—[(5a) deal with intruder]—(5b)put caterpillar outside in the
hole—(6) lay eggs—(7) cover up hole; if the caterpillar isn’t outside the hole at 5a, then
obviously the wasp must perform 3 again, followed by 4, etc. This may be a “routine,” but it’s
unclear to me why the routine of the wasp “always acting according to a set species-defining
behavioral pattern” precludes the behavior as rational.180
Let’s suppose, for instance, that an otherwise normal person shares a house with an
innocuous but rather annoying ghost who likes to turn off the lights he’s using. Sometimes, in
order to read at night, the man must sit by the light switch and flip it on again every so often in
order to keep reading. Would Okrent consider the man to be acting nonrationally by turning the
light back on repeatedly? Must the man find a novel means of illuminating the page to be
considered rational? It would seem that such an action by the reader and the wasp are no less
rational than any other proximate goal pursued in response to an unexpected (or at least
undesired) interruption.
Granted, wasps don’t have beliefs and desires; if birds do, then where’s the break? What
about toads? They’re deceivable by scientists. Karen Neander discusses at length how toads see
only “inter-aural disparities,” and thus anything shaped like prey and moving like prey will elicit
the toad to get it with its tongue—no matter if it’s actually a fly or a piece of lead.181 And yet,
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either way, the behavior is considered appropriate by neuroethologists.182 Shouldn’t we likewise
consider the wasp as acting appropriately by continuing to behave according to its speciesspecific means of achieving its goals? Okrent has no problem saying that the mistakes of
intentional animals are justified (because appropriate if not successful); why not with
nonintentional animals?183 Okrent here is less careful than he is later about confusing the success
of the act with the appropriateness of the act. As Fodor puts it, “Darwin cares how many flies
you eat, not what descriptions you eat them under.”184 Okrent again is at fault for giving
overblown, linguistic goals to lower-order animals: “The frog flicks its tongue in order to catch
an insect so as to make it a meal so that it can be nourished.”185 Why Okrent thinks that a
“nonrational” toad has such complex goals is beyond me. The frog or toad’s goal is simply
survival, and such animals survive by responding to visual stimuli of a certain shape and
movement. This tends towards nourishment by eating flies, but we may assume that seeds or
organic debris may occasionally look like flies to the animal without putting the appropriateness
of the action into question. That a scientist can “trick” the frog doesn’t make the frog’s actions
any less appropriate than they are for natural fly-like-moving objects—which is to say, the
actions are perfectly appropriate.
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Okrent discusses the “case of the poor frog,” but, while he doesn’t blame the frog for
being incapable of making such distinctions, this proves for him that such animals aren’t rational,
since they “do not have reasons of their own for doing what they do.”186 But we may easily
imagine that over time—a lot of time perhaps—the frog may learn to differentiate lead balls
from flies, just as the cat learned—very quickly—to differentiate shrews from mice. (See section
4.33 below.) The frog will not make this differentiation cognitively; evolution, however, might
shape its goals and abilities to achieve those goals through natural selection. One possible story
might go like this: A mutation develops whereby smells affect the accuracy of frogs, fly-smells
stimulate the frog brain, increasing its accuracy, and/or lead-smells hamper the frog’s accuracy
or generally disturb the frog. Over time, frogs with a strong sense of smell will be chosen for,
adding the sense of smell to that of sight in its “eating” behavior, and thus will now
“differentiate” between what was previously the same stimuli, millions of years prior. This
doesn’t rely on mental states, and shows how success is actually related to appropriate behavior.
What’s normative is biological and evolutionary, not what we think is normative for the frog. Of
course we do understand it as normative—and rational—if we remember that appropriate
behavior is species-relative (evolutionary/biological), not relative to the individual animal
(intentional successes).
Okrent is overly focused on the individual animal and mental states, and he wants to
think of rationality as a mental state instead of as a category. He says that frogs “are not rational
and do not have reasons of their own for doing what they do, even though there are of course
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good reasons for them to act in certain ways.”187 Okrent undercuts his theory by making
rationality depend on mental states; he has brilliantly shown how normativity is objectively
teleological, grounding what we mean by rationality, but unnecessarily adds intentionality to
teleology in his definition. A much simpler and powerful thesis would have been simply to
define rationality as normatively good goal-directedness. Instead, we have an ambiguous
category of nonrational animals, including wasps and frogs, and rational animals, but this
distinction is problematically vague—no longer objective and simple.188 What’s worse, Okrent
conceives of intentionality as linguistic, raising further worries and doubts about the
description’s viability, as I’ll show below. I think that it makes more sense to link rationality
with teleology: rational actions are those that are in line with the normative teleology of the
animal—for there are “good reasons for them to act in certain ways,” even if the animal doesn’t
have such reasons. Thinking doesn’t require thoughts, and one doesn’t need reason to act
reasonably.

Okrent’s Implicitly Discursive Bias in Mental Content
Okrent’s insistence that rationality must be thought in terms of idiosyncratic and adaptive
intentionality betrays that the mental content of beliefs for animals is inherently discursive for
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him. When he gives putative beliefs to wasps, they’re overblown to show how ridiculous such an
assertion would be; this straw-man attack, however, just shows how difficult it is to defend
rationality as intentionality, and how, implicitly, Okrent thinks of mental content as linguistic:
But if the wasp indeed acts on this desire, then the companion belief that
motivates what the wasp does must be something like “This cricket will still be
fresh if I sting it in this way but not in that.” But how could the wasp come to
believe that?”189
How indeed! How could Okrent really put such language into a wasp? And how could he do it
twice?
But, in this case, the belief that would work with this desire to explain the
behavior would have the content “I could find out whether there is something
dangerous in the burrow if I check inside.”190
By overplaying his hand (who’s insisting that wasps have intentional mental states?),
Okrent reveals that he views the intentional mental states of animals as implicitly discursive.
Indeed, Okrent describes rationality as “an ability to infer beliefs from information available to
[an agent] in the environment and an ability to establish new proximate goals in light of those
beliefs.”191 This sounds like Brandom’s description of human rationality: the giving and taking
of reasons as reasons. But this would not please Brandom, not even my revised Brandom that
allows for implicit inferences: the taking of reasons for reason is what Brandom means by
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“expliciting,” the making explicit of implicit inferences and the manipulation of those inferences
in a web of meaning. This is discursive thought.
For Okrent, what distinguishes humans from animals is not language per se; humans
simply have several degrees of beliefs and desires, and this allows us to have reflection, to act on
abstract concepts, and even to generate our own normative goals.192 He admits that such things
are possible only because of language, but he emphasizes the connection between animals and
humans based on shared intentionality, though of varying degrees: “The finely discriminated
contents of human intentional states do depend on the existence of language, but this fact should
never obscure the truth that language itself is possible only for a certain kind of instrumentally
rational agent.”193 He is trying to say that the philosophical tradition had erred in
overemphasizing the discursive difference between humans and other animals, and Okrent has
tried to correct the approach by showing how we can only understand the human mind fully if
we understand our shared rationality with animals. This is the same motivation as Alasdair
MacIntyre’s in Dependent Rational Animals, but MacIntyre is careful to preserve the discursive
separation (and spends a whole chapter on why animals like dolphins, no matter the complexity
of their communication, do not have language as such). Okrent is not as careful, and in
emphasizing the connection of intentionality between humans and higher-order animals, he
allows discursivity to bleed into the mental content of animals.
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Ironically, Okrent repeats the traditional mistake of anthropomorphizing animal minds.
When comparing humans and animals, Okrent is more careful, but when just discussing animals
(especially the difference between higher- and lower-order animals) he often slips into describing
intentional content in discursive terms. He claims that the behavior of the Plover bird gives a
“convincing flavor of logic and thoughtfulness,” in contrast to the Sphex wasp that betrays, he
thinks, a nonrational routine.194 As we see in the passage quoted above, the putative mental
content of the wasp is ridiculously discursive, especially for a bug.
Okrent’s view of mental intentionality is tainted with projections of discourse into the
minds of animals. This anthropomorphism of the higher-order animals becomes obvious when
applied to the lower-order animals. Rather than recognize his projection of discursivity onto
animals, he simply rejects animals like wasps as nonrational.
By making mental content overly discursive, Okrent shows his bias towards discursive
intentionality in animals; what he’s trying to do is show how wasps can’t have beliefs, therefore
they can’t have rationality. But animals don’t need to have thoughts to think; they don’t even
have to think to be described as rational if they are acting according to their appropriate
teleological norms. Initially, Okrent tied intentionality with goal-directedness, not rationality.195
Okrent’s watershed insight has nothing to do with rationality per se, but with teleology, that we
can evaluate behavior based on goal-directedness.
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For some reason, Okrent gets sidetracked with rationality as teleology, rather than
preserving the genius of the teleological project as it’s presented early in the book. In the next
section I will show how we can properly understand intentionality in terms of instrumentality,
thus showing why we don’t need animal instrumentalism to be discursive at all.

Mental States Aren’t Necessary to Understand Animals as Rational
I’ve just shown how easy it is to make mistakes about mental content; let me now show
how biological teleology can explain how intentionality works without appealing to discursive
mental states. Okrent features two animals in his book, the Sphex wasp and the plover bird, as
paradigm cases of biological and intentional teleology. He focuses on them, in part, because his
argument for teleology in simple animals like wasps and his anti-behaviorist account of
intentionality in animals like birds is the bulk and genius of his project, providing an objective
way to understand normativity in a noncircular, nonreductive way.
Okrent begins with the account of the Plover bird, and it is in terms of the intentionality
of the bird that he believes we can make sense of the goal-directedness of the wasp:
The ethologist can present the versatile adaptability of the plover’s behavior as a
datum because that addictiveness is a characteristic of the behavior itself, not the
plover. The behavior displays the pattern of tending to change so as to bring about
a result that varies as a function of the actual environment and the prior state of
the plover and serves to continue the existence of the plover’s young.196
Okrent argues against Fred Dretske that it is possible for behavior to be normative apart from
normative beliefs and desires. Okrent says that Dretske's worries stem from the recognition that
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logical behaviorism, which sought to understand mental states in terms of behavior, “failed
because it is inevitably circular.”197 Okrent argues that it isn’t circular because we can evaluate
behavior according to norms that don’t circle back to beliefs and desires, and to do this he
introduces the Sphex wasp, his example of biologically motivated animals, showing how
behavior is teleologically normative apart from mental states. He does this to free mental states
from the logical behaviorist’s circular reasoning; that is, Okrent believes higher-order animals do
have intentionality because he thinks it’s the best explanation for what they do, and so he wants
to show that normativity is outside the cyclical normative causal structure of intentions and
behavior. He introduces biological teleology via the Sphex wasp to show normativity that
doesn’t depend on beliefs and desires, thus freeing him to attribute beliefs and desires to animals.
If we can explain behavior without appealing to intentionality, then we don’t fall into a
hermeneutical circle of understanding normativity based on their relation. I’m arguing, however,
that if we can already understand appropriate animal action based on teleological norms, we
don’t need to worry about mental content.
I concede that intentionality may seem to be an easier explanation, but in fact it merely
raises more and harder questions. I wish to remain agnostic on the topic: since we don’t need to
explain mental content to explain behavioral rationality, let’s not invoke it. By way of analogy, I
believe that positing God is the simplest explanation for why the world is the way it is, but that
doesn’t mean we should invoke God when we are describing the way the world works. Though
we may believe in God’s immanence and sustenance of the world, to invoke him in explaining
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the motions of the planets raises more questions or is simply unnecessary. Just so with animal
minds: whether they don’t have mental states (like the Sphex wasp), or they may (like the Plover
bird), doesn’t bear on their normative behavior. Only with humans does normativity of beliefs
and desires matter apart from behavior, since our distinct teleology is the self-creation of our
own beliefs and desires for normativity.198
Okrent insists on intentionality in animals, reasonably enough, because it fits his
hierarchy of teleological rationality quite nicely. Simple animals like wasps have a kind of
biological, evolutionary programming that determines their goals. Complex animals display
versatile and idiosyncratic goals based on their beliefs and desires. Social animals have goals
created by and shared with a community. Humans act for our own goals and have self-conscious,
linguistic rationality that informs the lower kinds of rationality. These divisions seem right, but
we don’t need to talk about beliefs and desires in the second group as what motivates the more
novel goals any more than we need to talk about what motivates the community’s goals and
actions. Indeed, the impossibility of defending any explanation of mental content in animals is
apparent when we try to do the same with lower or higher animals: the wasp’s motivations are
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intuitive; the group’s motivations are also intuitive. Even if the group uses communication
(though this in itself would be hard to defend), it’s unreasonable to assume that the group
communicates its group goals and the means, e.g., that the female penguins should go hunt, and
the male penguins should care for their eggs, and if it gets cold, the whole group will be warmer
if we huddle together. No! Even if the penguins can and do communicate—it’s cold—huddle
together—that does not bear on the normative good of the group huddling together when it gets
cold, just like the wasp doesn’t have to have any conception of what it’s doing for it to be
normatively appropriate. Why then does Okrent insist that mental states are important for
understanding intentional action? Just as the wasp and the penguin flock don’t have to have any
awareness of appropriate action for their action to be right, so too intentional animals don’t need
to have awareness of their intentionality. Beliefs and desires needn’t be explicit mental states or
content for animals to act in a way that we can call intentional or rational.
My contention is that Okrent need not insist on explicit mental states for intentional
animals; it is not necessary or simpler, and so the burden of proof falls on Okrent. The Plover
bird may seem to be making judgments, and this may seem to imply mental states, or we may
just be anthropomorphizing its rationality. If the plover bird has beliefs about how to misdirect
the predator, and it changes its behavior based on the success of or failure of its plans, then the
bird would seem to be making judgments and have ideas, so to speak. But couldn’t we just be
reading into its actions like so many pet owners tend to do?199 It seems to me, however, that the
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bird can be making judgments without explicit mental states. Okrent does not give us any reason
to think that the plover bird acts otherwise than in a series of intuitive, richly diverse directedness
towards a goal—like a master chess player.

If Animals Could Play Chess: Mental Content and Automatic Agency
The plover bird seems to be doing something like playing chess: it knows possible moves
it can do, possible moves the other can do, and knows how its moves may affect the moves of the
other and vice versa. However, as even an amateur chess player knows, sometimes when you are
planning moves several steps removed, you all of a sudden get an aha! moment, and move
without any planning: you simply see a great move. Indeed, good chess players play speed chess
games this way—they just see the right moves and execute them. Are we in a position to say that
the plover bird doesn’t just act intuitively this way? The burden of proof for mental states thus
falls on Okrent, since we can explain animal behavior in general (e.g. the wasp) as normative
without reference to mental states, and rich, adaptive behavior (e.g. the bird) can be explained as
the intuitive grasp of the world.
That higher-order animals have an intuitive grasp of the world is a more conservative
statement than Okrent’s attribution of mental states. Mental states, at least for Okrent, implies
representation and explicit counterfactuals—in short, human reason. In Heidegger’s view of the
world, the intuitive grasp of the world is primary for Dasein, and an objective grasp of the world
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is secondary.200 Yet the fact that this secondary account is not primary does not render it trivial—
this is the domain of everydayness, and moreover, of science (no small matter). Yet we only
arrive at this stage, he claims, when the hammer breaks, when our intuitive grasp of the world is
shattered. The question Okrent must answer is whether or not animals experience un-readinessto-hand (Unzuhandenheit), as Dasein does; that is, when the intuitive grasp of the world breaks
down for the plover, does it really consider things in an objective, vorhanden way, or does it just
move on intuitively?
Heidegger gives three instances of Unzuhandenheit: unusability, lacking, and
obstruction.201 Unzuhandenheit has “the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of
presence-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand,” although “the presence-at-hand which makes itself
known is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment” and this vorhanden
understanding is “not thematic.”202 That is, Unzuhandenheit is still a mode—however
“deficient”203—of Zuhandenheit, and this deficiency makes the zuhanden conspicuous, thus
leading, possibly for Dasein, to Vorhandenheit. Since the conspicuousness is not thematic,
however, it is not necessarily vorhanden. Thus animals, if they experience some kind of
Zuhandenheit, can also experience Unzuhandenheit without necessarily leading them to
200
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Vorhandenheit. The plover bird, for instance, seems to experience Unzuhandenheit when its
broken wing display fails; that does not mean, however, that the bird begins then to think in a
vorhanden way, thematically or linguistically revising its beliefs and desires—the burden of
proof falls on Okrent, for even in our human engagement with the world, Unzuhandenheit does
not necessarily catapult us into Vorhandenheit; we may fix the tool, find the missing thing, or
remove the obstruction all in a zuhanden way.
In fact, we have every reason to believe that animals don’t experience a breakdown in
their engagement of the world that leads to Vorhandenheit, because for that to happen, animals
would have to have a profound self-awareness and reflective ability to comprehend
counterfactuals—discourse and all that entails—and this is not something that Okrent (let alone
Brandom and Heidegger) is ready to grant to any other animal besides the human.
There is a vast difference between apprehending and comprehending, as Anthony Esolen
points out in the introduction to his translation of Dante’s Paradise. Concerning heavenly things,
we are “dealing with mysteries that the human mind can apprehend but not comprehend, can
glimpse but not fathom”;204 similarly, animal minds can only apprehend what we can
comprehend, glimpse what we can fathom. MacIntyre rightly says that “only language enables us
to reflect on the truth or falsity of our beliefs, and so to consider reflectively about any particular
belief, as to whether it is true or false. But we do not need language to mark the most elementary
distinction between truth and falsity.”205 Okrent seems to think that an animal can only act
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intentionally or propositionally if that animal has intentional mental content that can serve as
reasons for acting, and the animal must be able to reflect on such beliefs and desires for its
actions to be considered rational. The problem is in the last part: animals don’t need reflection to
have mental states or beliefs and desires: the dog simply believes the squirrel is up this tree
because he saw it go up there; if he sees it cross the phone lines to another tree, his beliefs about
the location of the squirrel will change, but that doesn’t require reflection. Instead, higher-order
animals simply live in a normatively rich, intuitive, modal world. Modality does not necessitate
contemplation of possibility, only real possibilities for action (what the wasp lacks).
Intentionality lies between the nonintentionality of wasps and the linguistic rationality of
humans; Okrent believes that higher-order animals have beliefs and desires like humans, and that
allows them to have idiosyncratic and adaptive goals; this, however, seems to imply an analogy
to the human mind, namely discursive reflection, which is misleading, since animals don’t have
discourse. So what might nondiscursive beliefs look like?
MacIntyre gives the example of cats eating shrews: a cat will treat a shrew like a mouse
until it eats the shrew and becomes violently ill, after which it leaves shrews alone.206 The cat
now has beliefs about shrews, so to speak, that it didn’t have before; in fact, the cat now makes a
distinction between the two that it didn’t make before. The cat may now have the belief that
such-living-things [shrews] are different-from-[mice] and are not-to-be-eaten, but what this
might be doesn’t matter. The mental content does not affect the appropriateness of initially
treating a mouse-like animal as a mouse, of sharpening distinctions of mice and non-mice, and of
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avoiding non-mice. It doesn’t matter what the beliefs are like, or if there even are any; what
matters is the behavior, the appropriate execution of action towards novel, nonreflexive goals.
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CONCLUSION:
EXPLICATION ON BEHALF OF ANIMALS
Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being; but
essentially it is accessible only in Dasein.
Heidegger207
I’ve now shown why we don’t need to make the argument as strong as Okrent believes.
Just as we can understand instrumental behavior of wasps by way of goal-directed behavior of
higher-order animals, so too can we explicate goal-directed behavior of higher-order animals in
terms of intentionality without attributing mental states to such animals. That is, we can explicate
the implicit inferences of animals on their behalf.
Softening Okrent’s broad conception of rationality thus makes Okrent’s teleological
intentionality more plausible, since we can remain skeptical about the mental states of animals.
At the same time, this mitigated teleological intentionality enhances the Brandomian account of
intentionality by reserving explicit inferences for humans while at the same time extending
rationality as implicit inferences to animals. This is of course my central thesis, but as an added
bonus, by assimilating Okrent into Brandom’s framework we no longer need to depart from
Heidegger in the two ways mentioned in the last chapter. Understanding now may remain
discursive and exclusively proper to Dasein while at the same time conceding goal-directed
behavior to animals, since what counts as goal-directedness remains only explicated discursively
by Dasein even though the animals indeed do act in such a way.
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Similarly, though we keep the overarching normative structure of Okrent’s teleological
rationality, we now understand that structure from the perspective of Dasein. Thus we are not
merely adding discourse on top of evolutionary, instrumental, and social rationality; we can only
understand instrumental, behavioral, and social rationality by way of discourse, through the
world of Dasein.
Mightn’t we begin, as Heidegger does, with the human understanding of the worlds and
rationality in terms of Dasein? I believe this is what Okrent is implicitly doing: though he insists
that rationality springs from the ground up, I warrant, à la Heidegger, that discursive rationality
is that ground, that Grund, from which we can understand other rationalities, including those that
are “nonrational” or nonintentional, derivatively.
Okrent argues that we can make sense of instrumentality by way of behavioral or goaldirected behavior, though such goals are not mental in lower-order animals. Animals like wasps
respond predictably to various stimuli, and thus lack the flexible, adaptive richness of higherorder animals. Nonetheless, Okrent argues that we can make sense of this seemingly
programmed behavior in terms of goals. More specifically, Okrent believes “that there are very
good reasons to believe that the behavior of some animals is explicable by appealing to the goals
of the behavior even though those animals do not act rationally [intentionally].”208 Indeed, much
of Okrent’s project consists of showing how we can normatively explicate animal rationality
based on their specific teleologies. A—or perhaps the—human-specific goal is to understand the
world, including animals; why-asking, be it metaphysics or science or whatever you want to call
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it, is an essential aspect being human, and philosophy (let’s call it) is only possible because of—
or at least in—language.
Animals, no matter now rich their engagement in and understanding of the world and
other things, do not ask why there is something and not nothing. Indeed, we may be suspect of
their wondering why of anything.209 It is the human who wonders, leading her to do philosophy,
and it is language that allows us to do both.
I contend that we can’t understand animals without discourse. Indeed, for this reason
Okrent insists that animals have mental states, for this is, in some ways, a vulgar kind of
discursiveness. But we need not bastardize our notion of discourse and insist animals have it.
The better explanation is to remain skeptical about whether they do or don’t, instead of
attributing to them some putative nondiscursive “vague mental contents.”210 Indeed, Okrent
admits in Chapter 7 that language makes possible the complex mental states of humans, but he
doesn’t appreciate the profundity of human discourse and the dangers of (over)extending it
towards animals.
How humans explicate on behalf of animals is rather simple; indeed, we’ve been doing it
this whole time—even in Brandom’s chauvinistic examples. Regarding Brandom’s parrot,
Wanderer explains how easy this is:
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While animals may inquire “why” in the sense of “what” (why that noise? why that
sensation? etc.), this is really inquiring after something (what’s that noise? what’s that
sensation? etc.), not wonder. Animals may inquire, but can’t marvel.
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[even assuming parrots don’t have normative attitudes,] I…can nonetheless treat
the reliably trained parrot’s uttering “Raawk, that’s red”, as having the normative
status of being appropriate. …The significance of the vocal performance is
derived from the acknowledgement of the norms governing the performance by
other interpreting practitioners.211
That is, even if the bird isn’t aware of the norms, we can evaluate it according to those norms.
We need only point out that besides such arbitrary norms, we are also in a position to evaluate
the natural behavior of animals according to the normative teleology that Okrent outlined. We
don’t need to postulate whether the bird is aware of norms (beliefs and desires) to evaluate it
according to norms. As Okrent says, “Natural agents [animals] act as they do because by their
natures. Reflective agents act as they do because they accept reasons from which they can infer
actions that are appropriate given those reasons.”212 As Brandom rightly explains, humans live in
a realm of giving and taking for reasons, and part of that realm involves understanding the
reasons animals act; even if they don’t know their implicit reasons for acting, we can make those
reasons explicit for them.
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